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THE RELATION OF FUND CHARACTERISTICS AND FUND FAMILY 
MEMBERSHIP TO EQUITY FUNDS’ RISK-TAKING BEHAVIOR 
 
PURPOSE OF THE STUDY  
The first objective of this thesis is to reveal if equity funds with certain characteristics (e.g. 
large asset size, high fees) commit to certain type of risk-taking behavior in the Finnish fund 
market. Fund volatility is employed to measure funds’ risk-taking behavior, and a market-
adjusted volatility ratio is introduced in order to commensurate volatility levels of funds 
operating in different markets.  
The second objective is to assess if equity funds’ membership in a retail bank-backed fund 
family affects funds’ risk-taking behavior (family fund) in a way that their behavior differs 
from the risk-taking of funds with no retail bank background (non-family fund). Also, the goal 
is to find out if riskier or less risky funds are clustered into certain fund families.  
DATA  
The thesis uses monthly equity fund data collected from the official Mutual Fund Reports, 
published by the Federation of Finnish Financial Services. The sample includes all equity 
funds marketed in Finland and included to the Mutual Fund Reports during the sample period. 
The aggregate dataset consists of 27,372 monthly observations, covering a period from 
January 1998 to July 2009.  Monthly figures for fund characteristics are collected, and 
monthly volatility levels for both sample funds and their respective market benchmark indices 
are gathered. Market indices are MSCI Barra indices, and identical with the official 
benchmarks used on the Mutual Fund Reports.  
RESULTS  
The main characteristic related to risk-taking is the size of assets under management (AUM). 
Smaller funds commit to higher volatility levels both in absolute and market-adjusted terms. 
Lower subscription fees are charged by funds that favor higher volatility levels, whereas other 
fund fee types show no statistical relation. Funds having performed worse in previous month 
commit to higher risk levels during the following month whereas well-performed funds tend 
to commit to relatively lower risk levels in the following period.  
The second main finding states that funds belonging to a fund complex of a Finnish retail 
bank differ from the funds of non-retail bank funds. Within the nine largest retail bank fund 
families in Finland, risk is not randomly distributed across families, and low risk funds tend to 
be concentrated in smaller fund families. The risk concentration in turn can have a major 
impact on the risk profile of an investor confining her investments to a single fund family.  
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RAHASTOMUUTTUJIEN JA RAHASTOPERHEESEEN KUULUMISEN 
VAIKUTUS OSAKERAHASTOJEN RISKINOTTOKÄYTTÄYTYMISEEN 
 
TUTKIMUKSEN TAVOITE 
Tutkimuksen tavoitteena on selvittää, onko osakerahastojen piirremuuttujilla (kuten rahaston 
koolla tai palkkioiden suuruudella) yhteyttä rahastojen riskinottokäyttäytymiseen. 
Riskinottokäyttäytymistä kuvataan volatiliteetilla. Lisäksi riskinottoa mitataan 
markkinakorjatulla volatiliteettiluvulla eri markkinoilla operoivien rahastojen 
suhteuttamiseksi.    
Toisena tavoitteena on tutkia, onko vähittäispankkitaustaisten rahastoyhtiöiden rahastojen ja 
ei-vähittäispankkitaustaisten rahastoyhtiöiden rahastojen riskinottokäyttäytymisessä eroja. 
Lisäksi tavoitteena on selvittää, onko riski jakautunut tasaisesti eri vähittäispankkien 
rahastoperheisiin vai ovatko joidenkin rahastoperheiden rahastot riskisempiä kuin toisten. 
AINEISTO 
Tutkimuksessa käytetään kuukausittaista osakerahastodataa, joka on kerätty Finanssialan 
Keskusliiton julkaisemilta Rahastoraporteilta. Aineisto sisältää kaikki Suomessa markkinoidut 
osakerahastot, jotka otosperiodin aikaan ovat olleet Rahastoraportilla. Koko aineisto käsittää 
27,372 kuukausittaista rahastomuuttuja- ja volatiliteettihavaintoa ja kattaa periodin 1/1998–
7/2009. Lisäksi aineisto sisältää kuukausittaiset havainnot rahastomuuttujista sekä 
kuukausittaiset volatiliteettitasot rahastoille ja vertailuindekseille. Rahastojen 
vertailuindekseinä käytetään MSCI Barran markkinaindeksejä, joita on käytetty rahastojen 
virallisina vertailuindekseinä Rahastoraporteilla. 
TULOKSET 
Merkittävin osakerahastojen riskinottokäyttäytymiseen liittyvä muuttuja on rahaston 
pääomien koko. Pienemmillä rahastoilla on korkeampi volatiliteettitaso, mitattuna sekä 
absoluuttisesti että markkinakorjatusti. Korkeamman riskitason rahastot myös veloittavat 
matalampia merkintäpalkkioita. Lisäksi edellisellä periodilla huonommin menestyneiden 
rahastojen riskitasot ovat seuraavalla periodilla suhteessa korkeammat kuin edellisellä 
periodilla hyvin menestyneillä rahastoilla. 
Vähittäispankkitaustaisten rahastoyhtiöiden rahastot poikkeavat riskinottokäyttäytymiseltään 
muiden rahastoyhtiöiden rahastoista. Yhdeksän suurimman suomalaisen 
vähittäispankkiperheen sisällä korkean ja matalan riskin rahastot ovat keskittyneet tiettyihin 
rahastoperheisiin, ja pienemmillä rahastoperheillä on suhteessa enemmän matalariskisiä 
rahastoja kuin suurilla rahastoperheillä. Riskikeskittymillä voi puolestaan olla merkittävä 
vaikutus niiden rahastosijoittajien salkussa, joilla rahasto-omistukset ovat keskittyneet vain 
yhteen rahastoperheeseen. 
AVAINSANAT 
Osakerahasto, volatiliteetti, rahastoperhe, rahaston tuotto, rahaston koko, merkintäpalkkio 
 
 4 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
1  INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................ 7 
1.1  Motivation of the study ...................................................................................................... 7 
1.2  Objective of the study ........................................................................................................ 9 
1.3  Main findings ..................................................................................................................... 9 
1.4  Structure of the thesis ....................................................................................................... 10 
2  THEORETICAL BACKGROUND FOR MUTUAL FUNDS’ RISK-TAKING 
BEHAVIOR ............................................................................................................................ 11 
2.1  Categorization of risk-taking incentives .......................................................................... 11 
2.2  Compensational variable as an incentive ......................................................................... 13 
2.3  Behavioral variable as an incentive .................................................................................. 15 
2.3.1  Mutual fund tournaments ............................................................................................... 15 
2.3.2  Behavioral finance and risk-taking ............................................................................... 17 
2.4  Organizational fund attribute as an incentive ................................................................... 18 
2.4.1  The impact of fund size on risk-taking behavior ............................................................ 18 
2.4.2  Fund age and risk-taking behavior ................................................................................ 20 
2.4.3  Impact of fee level on risk-taking ................................................................................... 21 
2.5  Risk-taking behavior of family funds ............................................................................... 21 
3  HYPOTHESES ............................................................................................................... 25 
3.1  Research questions ........................................................................................................... 25 
3.2  Conceptualization of risk-taking behavior and fund family membership ........................ 25 
3.2.1  Risk-taking behavior ...................................................................................................... 25 
3.2.2  Fund family membership ............................................................................................... 25 
3.3  Hypotheses: risk-taking and organizational fund characteristics ..................................... 26 
3.4  Hypotheses: risk-taking and belonging to a fund family ................................................. 30 
4  METHODS ..................................................................................................................... 32 
4.1  Measuring risk-taking behavior across equity funds ........................................................ 32 
4.1.1  Measuring risk-taking behavior by simple fund volatility ............................................. 32 
4.1.2  Measuring risk-taking behavior by market-adjusted volatility ...................................... 33 
4.1.3  Regression model: Risk-taking and fund characteristics .............................................. 34 
4.2  Fund families and risk-taking behavior ............................................................................ 35 
4.2.1  Measuring fund family membership effect on risk-taking ............................................. 35 
4.2.2  Measuring risk concentration in fund families .............................................................. 36 
 5 
 
4.3  Methodological limitations .............................................................................................. 37 
4.3.1  Discussion on the validity of risk-taking measures ....................................................... 37 
4.3.2  Comments on the restricted sample size of fund family analysis ................................... 38 
5  DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS ................................................................ 40 
5.1  Data .................................................................................................................................. 40 
5.2  Distinct characteristics between family and non-family funds ........................................ 44 
5.3  Survivorship biases .......................................................................................................... 47 
5.4  Market benchmark indices ............................................................................................... 48 
6  RESULTS ........................................................................................................................ 50 
6.1  Relation of fund characteristics and risk-taking behavior – Initial model ....................... 50 
6.2  Fund characteristics and risk-taking behavior – Final model .......................................... 56 
6.3  Fund family membership and risk-taking behavior ......................................................... 65 
6.3.1  Risk level differences between family and non-family funds ......................................... 65 
6.3.2  Are high-risk funds concentrated into certain families? Panel evidence ...................... 69 
6.4  Investor perspective to mutual funds’ risk-taking behavior ............................................. 72 
7  CONCLUSIONS ............................................................................................................ 75 
APPENDICES ........................................................................................................................ 79 
REFERENCES ....................................................................................................................... 82 
 
  
 6 
 
TABLE OF FIGURES 
Table 1. Summary of Hypotheses on Mutual Fund Risk-Taking Behavior ............................ 31 
Table 2. Two Methods for Measuring the Relation of Risk-Taking Behavior and Fund 
Characteristics .......................................................................................................................... 39 
Table 3. Annual Characteristics of the Aggregate Sample, 1998–2009 .................................. 42 
Table 4. Summary Statistics for Organizational Fund Characteristics .................................... 43 
Table 5. Differences in Mean Characteristics of Family and Non-Family Funds ................... 45 
Table 6. Summary Statistics on Sample Fund Families .......................................................... 46 
Table 7. The Correlation Matrix for Risk Measures and Fund Characteristics ....................... 52 
Table 8. Initial Model: Regressions by Progressively Adding Variables ................................ 53 
Table 9. Final Model: Regressions by Progressively Adding Variables ................................. 55 
Table 10. Characteristics of High and Low Risk Level Funds ................................................ 57 
Table 11. Cross-Sectional Regressions for Risk-Taking Behavior – Simple and Relative 
Volatility ................................................................................................................................... 58 
Table 12. Risk Levels of Family and Non-Family Funds ...................................................... .67 
Table 13. Concentration of Low and High Risk Funds in Families ........................................ 70 
Table 14. Acceptance of the Seven Main Hypotheses ............................................................ 74 
 
Figure 1. Fund volatility to market index volatility from 1998 to 2009..................................56 
Figure 2. Annual average risk levels of family and non-family funds.....................................66 
 
Appendix A. The Derivation of Test Statistic for Measuring Risk Concentration in Fund 
Families.....................................................................................................................................79 
Appendix B. Initial Model: Individual Regressions for Model Variables...............................80 
Appendix C. Final Model: Family Dummy Included Instead of Assets Variable...................81
 7 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Motivation of the study 
 
“Put all your eggs in one basket, and watch that basket.” 
 
    Investment advice by Mark Twain
   
 
The managers of active mutual funds construct portfolios with specific risk characteristics in 
order to beat their benchmark indices. Actively managed mutual funds can strive for offering 
whether lower or higher volatility portfolio than the benchmark index but altogether, the fund 
should generate excess returns in order to offer a motivation for investing into the actively 
managed fund instead of in passive index fund. In turn, investors invest in mutual funds since 
they are generally acknowledged to offer 1) diversification benefits, 2) professional asset 
management and 3) lower marginal costs compared to direct investments.   
Previous academic studies since Jensen (1968) largely show that an average equity fund 
rarely outperforms passive benchmark indices. If the fund proves to beat the passive index in 
one year, the probability of performance persistence during following years is fairly low. 
However, actively managed mutual funds choose continuously risk levels that deviate from 
the one of their benchmark index. Thus, half of the managers of active mutual funds pursue 
investments decisions that often deteriorate fund’s overall performance rather than generate 
positive alphas. If it is acknowledged among fund managers that roughly only half of the 
funds are able to beat their benchmark index, why do they repeatedly choose risk levels and 
portfolios that deviate from the ones of passive benchmark indices? In addition to the hunt of 
superior returns, do some other variables explain the risk-taking behavior of mutual funds? 
Recent academic studies present several incentives which may drive mutual funds and 
managers within specific investment category to commit to certain kind of risk-taking 
behavior. One branch of the research indicates that incentive fee structures explain some part 
of funds’ risk-taking [see e.g. Elton, Gruber and Blake (2003)], whereas other studies show 
that characteristics of fund managers can have significant role in managers’ risk-taking 
behavior [see e.g. Golec (1996) and Chevalier and Ellison (1999)]. However, most of the time 
the fund manager does and even cannot act based on his personal interests. Asset management 
can be significantly dependent on the fund characteristics and operational strategies of an 
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individual fund, on a complex consisting of several funds or on the overall strategy of the 
fund company. Similarly to these fund characteristics (e.g. fee structure and fund size), 
membership in a fund family consisting of several fund siblings may function as the kind of 
externality inducing the fund to commit to certain type of risk-taking behavior. In more detail, 
how much do these externalities or fund characteristics tell about the risk-taking behavior of 
the fund and to how large extent are they related to funds’ risk-taking behavior? 
By August 2009, the capital invested in domestic mutual funds had grown to 48.1 billion euro 
in Finland. More than 75 percent of this capital was invested in mutual funds belonging to a 
complex consisting of several funds, or a fund family, managed by a retail bank operating in 
Finland. By the same time, mutual funds offered asset management to over 2.38 million 
Finnish fund investors – over 90 percent of these investors had invested in mutual funds 
belonging to the few largest fund families.  
Across fund families, 62.2 % of the assets in Finnish mutual funds were managed by two 
major retail bank-backed fund companies; measured by the number of investors, the two 
leading fund companies captured 65 % of all fund shareholders. With high probability, the 
main reason behind these investment decisions was rather the ease of combining banking 
services and investment management than a throughout and reasoned comparison of attractive 
and suitable investment alternatives.   
In the United States, many investors are obliged to concentrate their investments into one 
fund family due to the restrictions of 401k retirement plans [Elton, Gruber and Blake (2006)]. 
However in Finland, the majority of private investors hold shares in funds that belong to a 
single fund family although there does not exist any restrictive factors why the investor would 
have to confine her investments to a single fund family. The fund market in Finland is 
dispersed only to some extent, so most of the capital is concentrated into few larger bank-
managed families. The retail bank-managed funds in turn have found to yield lower returns 
[Knuutila, Puttonen and Smythe (2007)]. 
Massa (2003) argues that the investor first chooses the fund family and only after that the 
individual fund in which to invest. Investors may also prefer to invest in one family as it 
reduces the search costs incurred, explaining a significant part of fund investor behavior [see 
e.g. Sirri and Tufano (1998)]. The investor behavior described would at first appear rational, 
but in this case, the investor would not only concentrate his wealth into family funds instead 
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of allocating one part to non-family funds, but would also confine his investments into a 
single fund family. How does the situation change if the funds belonging to the same family 
follow similar investment strategies, concentrate on same industries or even buy same 
companies? Similar strategies of individual funds in the family can result in a situation where 
family fund returns are highly correlated and low and high risk funds are concentrated into 
certain families [Elton, Gruber and Green (2007)]. This in turn would mean an increase in the 
distribution of risk across investors and in the probability that the investor encounters a bad 
outcome by investing only in funds of a single family.  
1.2 Objective of the study 
The objective of this thesis is to examine if fund characteristics, such as fund size or fees, are 
related to the risk-taking behavior of equity funds. Secondly, the purpose is to reveal whether 
family funds of large retail banks operating in Finland commit to different kind of risk-taking 
behavior than non-family funds whose distribution channels are not that extensive and are 
thus not as easily available for the Finnish investors. Finally, investors in several countries, 
including in Finland, confine their fund investments to a single fund family, which is why one 
of the objectives is to uncover if high or low risk funds are concentrated into certain families. 
This thesis contributes to the prevailing academic studies in two ways: first, it reveals several 
motivators for mutual funds’ risk-taking behavior that have been only separately covered in 
previous studies; this is advantageous since it allows the recapitulation of findings and 
examination of possible linkages between these motivators. Second, the analysis on the 
differences of family and non-family funds brings up new evidence about the effect of fund 
family membership on the behavior of individual funds. On the practical side, this thesis 
importantly contributes to the studies on the highly bank-dominated Finnish mutual fund 
market by showing, that the concentration of capital to certain families does not necessarily 
motivate the families in their product proliferation and can significantly affect the risk profile 
of investor’s portfolio. 
1.3 Main findings 
This thesis shows that several fund characteristics can be related to the risk-taking behavior of 
mutual funds. Consistent with previous academic studies, the thesis shows that funds smaller 
in net asset value (NAV) commit to higher risk levels and to more aggressive risk-taking 
behavior. In terms of risk-return relationship, superior returns in prior period seem to be 
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followed by relatively lower volatility levels, implying that funds do lock into profits rather 
than overconfidently maintain or shift to higher risk levels. The results show strong evidence 
on high-risk funds trying to attract capital inflows by lower subscription fees. Measured both 
with raw and market-adjusted volatility, the relation of some fund characteristics and risk 
level differs depending if risk-taking is examined in relation to market risk levels. Finally, the 
findings imply that the relation of risk-taking behavior and fund characteristics is conditional 
to the extent fund’s volatility deviates from the market volatility. 
I find evidence that family and non-family funds differ by their risk-taking behavior, a 
phenomenon explained by the differences in their fund characteristics. The results show that 
also in the fund market in Finland, high and low risk funds are concentrated into certain 
families, and that especially funds of smaller families tend to be less aggressive in their risk-
taking behavior. Taken together, the findings suggest that externalities are closely related to 
the risk-taking behavior of funds, and that the bank-dominated fund market in Finland may 
not be the most functional one from the perspective of an individual investor – mainly due to 
the fact that the risk across investors is not randomly distributed but clustered to the portfolios 
of shareholders owning funds in certain families. 
1.4 Structure of the thesis 
The structure of the thesis is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the main findings of 
previous academic research and synthesizes the theories for the purpose of this study. Section 
3 presents the hypotheses. Section 4 describes the methods applied in this study, whereas 
Section 5 presents the dataset and descriptive statistics of the sample. Section 6 is the most 
relevant for the thesis as it presents the findings and analyzes the results. Section 7 concludes. 
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2 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND FOR MUTUAL FUNDS’ RISK-
TAKING BEHAVIOR 
The risk-taking behavior of mutual funds has been subject to a broad academic research in 
terms of what actually drives funds and fund managers in their risk-taking behavior. 
Following the findings of preceding studies, the next four subsections categorize the main 
three incentives for funds’ risk-taking behavior. Each of these incentives is then analyzed in 
light of how they can drive mutual funds to commit to certain type of risk-taking behavior. 
Finally, the theoretical discussion is guided towards the hypothesis that, in addition to other 
previously studied attributes, also fund characteristics and fund family membership could be 
exploited in evaluating the risk-taking behavior of mutual funds.  
2.1 Categorization of risk-taking incentives 
The incentives that steer mutual funds’ risk-taking behavior can be divided into several 
categories depending on if they are set externally or relate to a more personal level of fund 
manager. The incentives that have been found to affect the risk-taking differ by their visibility 
to investors; namely, only a small fraction is salient or regularly reported, and it is not 
possible to even evaluate many of them due to the fact that they can relate to personal 
characteristics of the manager. Thus, in many cases it is difficult to measure what kind of 
impact the incentives can indirectly have on the value of investor’s portfolio.  
In their study on the effects of prior performance on the following managerial risk-taking, 
Ammann and Verhofen (2007) divide the incentives that steer fund managers’ decision-
making into two categories that relate to managerial compensation and investor behavior. 
Golec (1996) in turn studies the impact of managerial characteristics on fund performance and 
behavior and argues that “managers make investment decisions based upon their personal 
abilities and risk preferences”. For the purpose of this study, I define three incentive 
categories which I argue to explain the risk-taking behavior of mutual funds: 
A)  Compensational variables  
B)  Behavioral variables 
C)  Organizational fund variables  
 12 
 
Compensational variables relate to compensation schemes and bonuses managers receive 
regularly. For example, the manager can have interests in maintaining higher risk levels as it 
can have a positive impact on fund’s return and consequently on manager’s personal wealth 
through a compensation scheme. In turn, behavioral variables are internal and generated on a 
more personal level of the fund manager; for example, the manager can be induced to adjust 
fund’s risk level in order to beat the benchmark index and to obtain a favorable ranking and 
eligible status in the eyes of market participants.  
Organizational fund variables relate to fund characteristics that the manager cannot affect 
directly or at all. For example, legal investment limitations, investment policy of the fund and 
fund attributes defined in the market can construct external limits for risk-taking behavior. 
Managers of younger funds can be more active risk-adjusters as they aggressively try to 
survive during the first critical period by attracting new capital inflows, in addition to which 
risk levels can be adjusted in order to maximize the profits collected through different fees. 
The complexity and structure of the fund family can also create different set of objectives for 
funds in the family and therefore directly affect the risk-taking of individual fund.  
Both compensational and behavioral incentives are fairly difficult to observe although there 
has been a tendency in favor of for example public information closures of managerial 
ownership and compensation schemes; namely, the requirements for more detailed reporting 
of managerial ownership and compensation schemes are justified due to information 
asymmetry and agency problems that exist in the mutual fund market.1    
Instead, organizational fund attributes that are reported regularly or otherwise salient to 
investors (e.g. fund’s asset size, ownership structure and distribution channel) have attracted 
mainly secondary role in previous studies. Still, it can be argued that organizational fund 
variables set the outermost limits for fund’s risk-taking behavior; consequently, they can have 
contribution in estimating fund’s risk-taking behavior, which means that they could also have 
direct effects on the decision-making of an investor who tries to estimate how fund’s risk 
profile fits to his aggregate portfolio. Before examining the role of organizational fund 
attributes in the risk-taking behavior of funds, it is important to understand the other two 
incentive categories in order to comprehend how all the three contribute to mutual fund 
                                                 
 
1 See for example http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch051205css.htm. “Conflicts of Interests in Asset 
Management”, May 12, 2005, Chester S. Spatt.  
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behavior. Thus in the next three subsections, I discuss each of the three incentive categories 
separately. 
2.2 Compensational variable as an incentive 
Increasing requirements for transparency and disclosure of additional information have 
motivated academic instances to estimate what are the actual effects of compensation schemes 
and managerial ownership on fund performance [see e.g. Carpenter (2000), Elton, Gruber and 
Blake (2003) and Kumlin (2008)]. In addition, managerial compensation schemes have 
attracted attention as it has not been clear if they are efficient enough to serve their initial 
purpose of eliminating agency problems. Based on both academic research and discussion of 
practitioners, it is ambiguous how for example augmented disclosure of the information on 
managerial compensation schemes would serve for the decision-making process of investor if 
the effects of the compensation schemes on managerial behavior are not clear and consistent. 
In general, fund managers receive economic incentives, or compensation based on their 
relative performance and assets under management (AUM). Chevalier and Ellison (1997) 
study managerial incentives in terms of the shape of flow-performance curve. They employ a 
sample of growth and income funds from 1983 to 1993 to estimate the shape of the flow-
performance relationship. Their semiparametric model shows that the curve is convex and 
that the significant deviation from the linearity in particular explains the risk taking behavior 
of fund managers. Due to the convexity, the flow-performance relationship serves as an 
incentive scheme set by the market participants, and fund managers alter their risk levels 
according to the incentivizing effects of this relationship. The fund managers are induced to 
increase risk since the fund is rewarded with larger capital inflows if it is able to generate 
superior performance, but on the other hand, is not commensurately punished if the higher 
risk-taking ends up to large losses. If the investors do not redeem their shares in case of bad 
performance, this means that funds do not necessarily have the incentive to move to more 
conservative risk levels. The compensational incentives can be directly derived from the 
findings of Chevalier and Ellison: as the managers strive for both increasing the capital inflow 
and AUM and maximizing the profit in order to obtain larger economic compensation, they 
evidently take more risk due to the convex shape of the curve. 
Carpenter (2000) models managerial risk-taking in the framework of risk aversion when the 
compensation scheme is a call option on fund’s assets. She starts solving the manager’s 
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investment problem under the assumption that if the manager aims at maximizing personal 
utility, the option ends up deep in or deep out of the money. The manager is hence induced to 
increase fund volatility as the value of option goes to zero, an evolution analogous to the one 
created by the flow-performance convexity. However, Carpenter suggests that option 
compensation does not necessarily lead to higher risk levels and may even induce the 
manager to adjust the fund volatility to lower levels than if the manager was trading for his 
own account, since the leverage inherent in the option increases manager’s exposure to fund 
volatility. She also finds that options that are deep out of the money provide incentives for 
excessive risk-taking, a finding consistent with the theory of behavioral finance that investors 
tend to be more risk-seeking when a negative outcome is more prevalent.  
Elton, Gruber and Blake (2003) study the impact of incentive fees2 on fund managers’ 
behavior. While studying the relation of beta, return (alpha) and incentive fees they find that 
mutual funds with an incentive fee system exhibit more aggressive risk-taking than funds that 
do not have incentive fees. They link the incentive-fee-funds to better stock selection ability 
which implies that the managerial compensation schemes function correctly from the point of 
agency-problem at least for these funds. Their results also show that managers increase the 
risk level after a period of poor performance which is consistent Brown, Harlow and Starks 
(1996) who suggest that the risk increase effect is even more dominant for mid-year losers 
who also tend to manipulate their volatility levels differently.  
In aggregate, the previous literature implies that the year-end increase in risk appetite is due to 
the managerial compensation schemes that are based on annual fund flows and the level of 
funds’ net asset value (NAV) at the end of the year. It also seems that the risk-taking behavior 
in the presence of a compensation plan does not necessarily amend the agency problem in the 
market for mutual funds, and this asymmetry originates from the convexity of flow-
performance curve.  
  
                                                 
 
2 Incentive fees are more commonly used among hedge funds, and they can be defined as reward structures that 
make management compensation a function of investment performance relative to some specific benchmark. For 
example, only 1.7% of all bond and stock mutual funds in 1999 had incentive fees [Elton, Gruber and Blake 
(2001)]. 
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2.3 Behavioral variable as an incentive 
Incentives for managerial risk-taking are behavioral if the fund manager is induced to conduct 
certain behavior to gain non-monetary and non-concrete recognition on a personal level. For 
example, a manager can be induced to make certain decisions about fund’s risk level in order 
to try to obtain a higher performance ranking among the peer group. Fund’s ranking within 
both peer group and against market benchmark index at the end of the year affect the amount 
of managerial compensation, but they also have direct impact on status-related factors of 
manager; the well-performing manager is perceived as a talent who has superior stock-picking 
abilities and the status is further enforced if the manager manages to generate positive alpha 
also in the following year.  
Mutual funds and individual fund managers are ranked by several parties based on their 
performance, and the rankings have been found to have positive correlation with fund flows 
[see e.g. Goezmann and Peles (1997) and Sirri and Tufano (1998)]. For example, Brown, 
Goetzmann and Park (2001) study how the volatility level decisions of hedge fund managers 
and commodity trading advisors (CTAs) relate to their career concerns and fund survival. 
They argue that fund termination is a function of performance relative to industry benchmarks 
so that funds lacking in the industry are less probable to survive. Thus, reputation costs in the 
investment industry are highly dependent on manager’s relative ranking points, and a bad 
status can dramatically affect the career of the manager.  
Kosowski, Timmermann, Wermers and White (2006) in turn use a bootstrap analysis to 
uncover if star managers really exhibit stock-picking talent or if their superior performance is 
due to pure luck. In addition to the results supporting the superior talents of star managers, 
they find that funds often have dynamic strategies that are dependent whether on overall 
market movements or on fund’s relative ranking among similar funds. Their findings thus also 
suggest that fund’s risk-taking is closely related to its benchmark universe. Therefore, the 
manager has incentives for both ameliorating his ranking among the other fund managers and 
maximizing fund inflows next year. 
2.3.1 Mutual fund tournaments 
In previous academic research, the phenomenon of risk increase towards the end of the year is 
referred as mutual fund tournaments [see e.g. Brown et al (1996), Busse (2001), Koivulintu 
(2002) and Goriaev, Nijman and Werker (2005)] as the managers who lack benchmark 
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performance in mid-year strategically increase their portfolio volatility in order to beat or at 
least to catch up with their peer group. Controversially, funds having performed well during 
the preceding period tend to move to conservative risk levels.  
Koski and Pontiff (1999) study the usage of derivatives in the mutual fund industry and find a 
negative relation between change in fund risk and prior performance within calendar year, and 
this relation is significantly less severe for funds using derivatives. Their findings are also 
consistent with the majority of academic research suggesting that the above-benchmark 
managers lock in to their profits towards the end of the year and consequently decrease their 
risk-taking. 
On the other hand, Busse (2001) studies the tournament phenomenon with different method 
by using daily return data instead of monthly data. His results prove the tournament effect to 
disappear after controlling for the autocorrelation between daily returns. He also claims that 
irrespective of incentive fee contracts, the competitive environment in the mutual fund 
industry affect managers’ risk taking behavior. Deriving from his arguments, the behavior of 
the manager can be seen as a function of the benchmark performance alongside with the 
incentives created by compensation schemes. As the above-benchmark manager receives non-
monetary recognition from behalf of both investors and fund industry in addition to the 
monetary compensation, the argument strongly suggests that a large part of the managerial 
risk-taking is based on behavioral incentives.  
Koivulintu (2002) studies the relation of risk-taking behavior and preceding returns of Finnish 
equity funds. By employing a sample consisting of all funds investing in Finnish equities 
during 1989-2000, he finds indications that also Finnish funds commit to tournament 
behavior. He shows that funds having performed well in the previous period tend to decrease 
their risk levels on the consequent period, whereas worse-performing funds are prone to 
increase their volatility towards the end of the year. In addition, he finds significant 
differences between the behavior of funds managed by larger retail banks and smaller fund 
companies; especially, bank-managed funds tend to offer significantly lower returns than non-
bank funds. 
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2.3.2 Behavioral finance and risk-taking 
In recent research, the concepts of behavioral finance have been related to managerial risk-
taking. Carpenter (2007) argues for example that, irrelative of option compensation, the 
volatility of fund converges to the Merton constant3 as asset value goes to infinity, providing 
that the fund manager has constant relative risk aversion (CRRA). The logic of Carpenter 
suggests that there exists a break point for manager’s risk-taking behavior that is based on the 
magnitude of manager’s risk aversion – when a certain break point is crossed manager’s 
behavior is no longer dependent on external factors to the same extent. In this case, the risk-
taking behavior of fund is significantly affected by the risk aversion level of the manager. 
Nevertheless, although the risk-taking behavior of individual investor is mainly driven by the 
person’s level of risk aversion, fund manager has to first consider the external factors 
determining the limits for risk-taking. This means that the risk aversion of manager eventually 
has impacts only within the limits emerging from external factors. 
Ammann and Verhofen (2007) approach managerial risk-taking from a Bayesian perspective 
and argue that managers update their beliefs according to their prior performance. They find 
that prior performance has a positive impact on fund’s following risk level so that the well-
performed managers are eager to take more risk in the following year, suggesting tendency of 
overconfidence for these managers as the study does not provide any proof of return 
persistence. Similar Bayesian models of fund managers’ strategic behavior have been used in 
studies of Lynch and Musto (2003) and Dangl, Wu and Zechner (2008), for example. The 
implications of their studies, especially the usage of Bayesian perspective, relate closely to the 
concepts of anchoring and adjustment of reference point4, well-known psychological 
heuristics in the behavioral finance literature. However, although fund managers would act as 
Bayesians and updated their behavior according to prior performance and fund market 
reactions, it does not necessarily signify that their behavior is biased. Fund managers’ 
adjustment and anchoring for these purposes can serve as a rational means to respond to the 
expected or anticipated behavior of fund investors. 
                                                 
 
3 For theoretical presentation of the Merton constant, see Merton (1969), Lifetime Portfolio Selection Under 
Uncertainty: The Continuous-Time Case.   
4 Anchoring describes the tendency of individuals to lock into a reference point to which they compare and 
evaluate the subsequent outcomes. Adjustment in turn relates to the reassessment and re-setting of reference 
point according to preceding events. 
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The academic research offers evidence of the effect of behavioral incentives on fund’s risk-
taking, especially of the importance of managerial status in the industry and ranking among 
the peer group. However, as in case of compensational incentives presented in subsection 
2.1.1., these behavioral incentives are difficult to observe or quantify for an average fund 
investor. Consequently, the next subsection presents the third incentive category for mutual 
funds’ risk-taking behavior: these incentives can be directly derived from the information 
which is salient and easily interpretable for the investor. 
2.4 Organizational fund attribute as an incentive 
Organization incentives arise from variables that are explicitly observable or regularly 
reported fund attributes, set legal conditions or relate to fund’s investment strategy. They can 
affect fund or managerial-level risk-taking both in a restrictive or incentivizing way. For 
example, the size of fund portfolio can significantly predefine what kind of investments or 
transactions the fund is able to carry out. Incentivizing variables in turn do not explicitly 
restrict fund’s risk-taking but instead steer the fund towards specific kind of risk-taking 
behavior.  
In general terms, organizational variable is any qualitative or quantitative fund-specific 
information that can vary over time. For example variables relating to shareholder base, fund 
size or fund administration and strategy can be defined as organizational fund variables. 
Another specification for the variables is that all of this information is regularly reported or 
otherwise observable for fund investors. The next subsections discuss the relation of 
organizational variables and risk-taking in light of prior research and present the theoretical 
rationalization for why the linkage between them should exist. 
2.4.1 The impact of fund size on risk-taking behavior 
Pollet and Wilson (2008) study the effect of fund size on fund behavior. They argue that 
funds with larger NAV confront more often liquidity constrains, higher ownership costs and 
regulatory investment restrictions5 and that the diminishing returns to scale of actively 
managed mutual funds make fund managers to alter their investment behavior as the AUM 
                                                 
 
5 For example, the EU restricts mutual funds classified as UCITS funds from investing more than 10% of their 
net assets in transferable securities of any sole issuing body. These kinds of restrictions have direct effect on the 
level of diversification and thus, have significant impact on mutual fund’s risk profile and investment behavior.  
(http://www.ey.nl/download/publicatie/UCITS_III-A-Practica-_Guide-June-2003.pdf) 
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increases. Pollet and Wilson employ a matched sample of funds’ equity holdings by stock 
from 1975 to 2000 and find that managers of larger funds diversify only because they are 
prevented by their size from increasing existing stock weights without incurring significant 
ownership costs. Thus, if the fund confronts liquidity constraints it is more probable that the 
manager diversifies his portfolio. According to Pollet and Wilson, “funds choose a minimal 
level of diversification to reduce risk”. Consistent with this argument, the results of Prather, 
Bertin and Henker (2004) imply that fund’s market capitalization has a direct impact on 
fund’s ability and flexibility to pursue a particular investment strategy and this effect is 
negative – they find analogously that fund performance is negatively related to market 
capitalization of the fund.  
Based on the convexity of the flow-performance curve, it can be argued that larger funds have 
more conservative behavior in terms of risk. As fund flow is a convex function of past 
performance, asset size is consequently a function of flow and performance. As fund’s AUM 
gets larger, the fund collects more fees in form of management fees and may not have such a 
high incentives to increase its portfolio risk further or to aim at the highest performing deciles 
in its peer group. Furthermore, larger funds are often older which means that they have 
reached relatively stable status and reputation among investors; fund flows are not necessarily 
dependent on prior performance to such extent as they are for smaller and younger funds 
which suggests these funds are able to maintain their position in the market with less effort 
and with only moderate returns. 
Consistent with the argument of fund size affecting negatively to fund performance, both 
Chen, Hong, Huang and Kubik (2004) and Yan (2008) find a significant inverse relation 
between fund size and fund performance. As fund’s risk-taking is considered, there exist two 
feasible explanations: larger funds take consciously less risk or they take wrong kind of risk 
in form of bad investments which deteriorates their overall performance. Larger funds have 
normally larger resources devoted to the research of investment opportunities. They should 
thus have longer lists of feasible investment opportunities and pursue better investment 
decisions indicating that, on average, they should incur fewer losses due to taking wrong risk. 
Therefore, the inferior performance of larger funds can stem from decreased volatility of their 
portfolios. 
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Tapio (2002) employs Finnish mutual funds data to examine the size effect on mutual funds’ 
tracking error.6 By analyzing the relation of fund size and tracking error magnitude for a 
period of 1997-2001, she finds that Finnish mutual funds do not show propensity to move to 
more passive strategies as their size increases. The findings of Tapio indicate that during the 
sample period, Finnish funds do not seem to suffer from decreased returns to scale (e.g. 
liquidity constrains or higher transaction costs). After year 2001 however, the average asset 
size of Finnish funds has increased significantly which may have affected their trading 
possibilities and investment behavior.  
2.4.2 Fund age and risk-taking behavior 
For younger funds, flow-performance incentives are higher firstly because they are smaller 
and require more resources, for example in terms of advertising, to attract capital inflows and 
secondly, as they incur challenges in terms of survivorship. Ackermann, McEnally and 
Ravenscraft (1999) study the performance of hedge funds in terms of risk, return and 
incentives. Their findings suggest that fund age does not significantly affect portfolio risk for 
hedge funds but that there exist significant differences in the total risk profiles among specific 
hedge fund categories.  
Controversially, Brown, Goetzmann and Park (2001) find that the survivorship of older funds 
is less sensitive to performance which implies that funds with longer track record should have 
lower risk and have an incentive to aim only at average benchmark returns. Consistent with 
the argument of diminishing incentives to growth, older funds have reached larger AUM to 
which fund fees and managerial compensation is linked, which arguably can act as a 
disincentive for managers of older funds. In addition,  the results of Brown et al indicate that 
funds lacking in the industry are less likely to survive, and even though the short-term profit 
maximization through risk-taking is not that attractive even for younger funds, their 
survivorship in the industry is more dependent on their relative performance. This finding 
suggests that younger funds should reach for higher relative returns owing to the costs of 
higher probability of termination, and these incentives induce them to take more risk than 
their older counterparts. 
                                                 
 
6 Tracking error is widely used as the measure of active management for mutual funds. It describes how closely 
the fund follows the index to which it is benchmarked.  More precisely, tracking error is measured as the 
standard deviation of the difference between index and fund returns.  
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2.4.3 Impact of fee level on risk-taking 
Higher fee level generally indicates that the portfolio is more actively managed, i.e. fund’s 
turnover ratio is higher. Actively managed funds consistently attract larger inflows than index 
funds, and investors thus continue to pay higher fees even though many studies have shown 
that active funds underperform their benchmark indices at least after accounting for expenses 
[see e.g. Gruber (1996) and Edwin, Gruber and Busse (2004)]. The diverging risk-taking 
behavior of actively managed funds should appear as higher or lower relative volatility levels 
and consequently, funds with higher fees should have proportionally higher volatility levels 
than low-fee funds. Although in general high fee levels of funds are associated with more 
active management, it should be remarked that previous studies also suggest the higher fees 
not to be solely a result of active management but also dependent on decreased search costs7 
[Sirri and Tufano (1998)].   
2.5 Risk-taking behavior of family funds 
Fairly few academic studies have focused on the question of how fund’s belonging to a fund 
family affects the behavior of individual funds in the family [see e.g. Gaspar, Massa and 
Matos (2006), Elton, Gruber and Green (2007), Pollet and Wilson (2008)]. A fund family 
refers to a mutual fund company managing multiple own funds. The more profound 
examination of the subject is justified since the role and popularity of fund families in several 
countries is significant and before, the matter has not attracted vast discussion. 
To start with, the managers of family funds can have less freedom in influencing the risk 
profile of their fund; family funds are more to serve for the requirements within the fund 
family and do not necessarily pursue strategies irrespective of other family funds. The 
concentration of portfolio management at family level can mean that family funds do not 
necessarily offer a diverse set of funds with low correlation, which would mean that, to 
diversify effectively, the investor should have to go outside the family. In other words, the 
latest studies show that concentrating one’s investments into one fund family can have 
detrimental effects on investor’s portfolio risk. 
                                                 
 
7 Previous academic research suggests that investors are willing to incur higher fund fees if the specific fund is 
found and identified with less effort, for example due to heavy advertising. 
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Elton, Gruber and Green (2007) examine how the risk profile of investor’s portfolio is 
affected if all investments are confined to a single fund family. In their study, they employ a 
sample of 988 individual funds from 100 families to study the effect of the family on the risk-
taking of individual fund. They find that family funds’ volatilities are often highly correlated 
which arises from similar investment strategies, i.e. simultaneous concentration on specific 
sector or industry and therefore, fund variances are not randomly distributed across fund 
families. Their results also prove the families to show a propensity to focus on either high or 
low risk strategies, so for the investor, investing within one fund family means an increase in 
the probability of a bad outcome. They estimate that if an additional fund is selected from the 
family rather than outside, the added fund would need to offer a return from 50 to 70 basis 
points higher in order to maintain the same Sharpe ratio on investor’s portfolio. 
Bliss, Potter and Schwarz (2008) examine how the performance and risk-taking activities of 
team-managed funds differ from the activities of individually managed funds. By studying the 
risk-taking behavior of 3,000 US equity funds for a sample period of 12 years, they find that 
team-managed funds are significantly less risky and exhibit lower turnover ratios than 
individually managed funds. Also, team-managed funds prove to attract significantly larger 
capital inflows than individual funds, indicating that many funds managed by a group should 
be larger than individually managed, and possibly belong to a larger fund complex consisting 
of several fund siblings. 
Team-managed funds are analogous to family funds as also family fund strategies are outlined 
at a more centralized level, meaning the framework for individual fund strategies is 
determined by a group of managers. The findings of Bliss et al. therefore support the results 
of Elton et al. on group-managed funds having less risky portfolios, but on the other hand, do 
not show that group-managed funds would at the same time hold portfolios that have 
significantly higher risk levels.  
Pollet and Wilson (2008) contribute to the family discussion by suggesting that funds in more 
complex organizations are less likely to diversify in response to the growth in fund’s AUM. 
The organizations of several funds prefer establishing new funds instead of increasing fund’s 
ownership shares in stocks they already own. Their study shows that, absent ownership 
constraints, family funds tend to diversify to the proportion of their existing portfolio and 
rather focus on fewer stocks on an individual fund level. In aggregate, the pace of 
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diversification tends to decrease as the number of siblings in the family increases. This in turn 
would suggest that family funds have higher volatility levels. 
The findings of Pollet and Wilson also rationalize for diversification carried out on the family 
level, meaning that fund families offer diversification possibilities to investors more among 
family rather than among one fund. Also from fund family’s point of view, the As for a single 
fund the investment strategy relates to fund’s relative target position among its competitors, 
family funds’ risk-taking behavior and strategies are dependent also on the overall family 
strategy. The need for this two-fold attention also suggests that family funds compared to 
single funds should have differing attitude towards risk and that this difference could be 
observed in their choices of risk level. Inductively, fund families operate like a single fund 
and the risk-taking behavior of a family fund depends also on its relative position among 
other funds in the family. Considering that the majority of investors can be estimated to hold 
only 1-3 funds on average, the kind of family behavior would be inconsistent with the first 
motivation of why investor should invest in a mutual fund in the first place; diversification 
benefits. 
Gaspar, Massa and Matos (2006) argue that fund families pursue risk sharing and strategic 
cross-fund subsidization in order to maximize the profit of the fund company in aggregate. 
They examine how funds within the family are conveyed among the organization and if 
certain funds are favored at the expense of other family funds. Their results do suggest 
differing incentives for family funds and show that these funds exhibit strategic performance 
shift among the funds in the family in order to favor the ones that are to increase the overall 
family profit. They consider the cross-fund subsidization to happen from low to high fee 
funds, from low performing to currently better performing funds and from older to younger 
funds. High-fee, better performing and younger funds are considered of higher value and 
therefore they are preferred among the fund family. Consistent with other studies, the findings 
of Gaspar et al suggest that family funds have specific incentives for risk-taking and that 
family funds alter their portfolio risk level more often than single funds. 
In aggregate, the implications of previous studies strongly suggest that organizational fund 
variables or more precisely, fund characteristics, can have significant role in mutual funds’ 
risk-taking behavior. The fact that organizational attributes are the only incentive category 
that is easily observable for fund investor further supports the motives of this thesis to more 
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closely examine and recapitulate the impact of organizational fund variables on mutual funds’ 
risk-taking behavior. 
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3 HYPOTHESES  
3.1 Research questions 
This thesis has two main objectives in terms of evaluating the risk-taking behavior of mutual 
funds. First, the purpose is to study if in general, salient and reported fund characteristics 
relate to fund’s risk-taking behavior and to discuss why certain types of funds show 
differences in their risk-taking behavior. Second, the objective is to examine the role of fund 
family membership in mutual funds’ risk-taking behavior. The thesis is built on the following 
three main research questions: 
           I. Which fund characteristics are related to equity funds’ risk-taking behavior? 
          II. Do family and non-family funds engage in different kind of risk-taking behavior? 
III. Do fund families show a propensity to concentrate on high or low risk strategies? 
3.2 Conceptualization of risk-taking behavior and fund family 
membership 
3.2.1  Risk-taking behavior 
I define the term risk-taking behavior as mutual fund’s style to perceive risk and maintain 
specific risk level from period to period in relation to fund’s benchmark index or group. Thus, 
risk-taking behavior refers to fund’s tendency to have higher or lower risk levels than other 
funds in its peer or comparison group have.  
Conventional risk-taking behavior signifies that the fund prefers to maintain low risk 
(volatility) levels from period to period and this behavior differs from the one of fund’s peer 
group. Inversely, if the fund exhibits more active or aggressive risk-taking behavior, it more 
probably has a portfolio that has higher risk level than the one of an average fund in its 
benchmark group.  
3.2.2 Fund family membership 
By fund family membership, I refer to fund’s belonging to a larger fund complex managed by 
a retail bank operating in Finland. The motivation for this type of division relies on the fact 
that the mutual fund market in Finland is highly bank-dominated. The designation as a fund 
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family signifies that funds belonging to the family have more extensive distribution channels 
due to their retail banking background than funds not belonging to a family. In practice, the 
definition does not set any lower limit for the number of funds in the family, but includes the 
assumption that the fund manager cannot manage independently his fund irrelevant of the 
strategies of other funds in the family. This means that, in addition to following individual 
investment strategies, their strategies are constructed to serve for the goals of the fund 
complex in aggregate.  
3.3 Hypotheses: risk-taking and organizational fund characteristics 
As presented in Section 2 discussing the theoretical background, previous academic research 
presents controversial or deficient results on the effects of fund variables on mutual funds’ 
risk-taking behavior. I argue that organizational fund variables can be whether directly or 
indirectly related to fund’s risk-taking behavior, and this relation is either positive or negative 
depending on the variable. The organizational fund variables or, characteristics, employed in 
this study are: fund size, age (AUM), minimum investment requirement, fund’s one month-
performance in previous month, number of shareholders and the level of subscription, 
redemption and management fee.  
Next, I set the hypotheses for the relation of fund variables and fund’s risk-taking behavior. 
The analysis is based on the following eight null hypotheses that are derived from the 
implications of previous academic research discussed in section 2. 
H1: Larger funds take less risk.  
Mutual funds compete for new capital inflows that can be attracted through above-benchmark 
performance. The flows are directly related to the size of the fund complex [Sirri and Tufano 
(1998)] and a large fund having accumulated inflows in the past has presumably also had a 
good track record that has attracted the capital. Thus on average, the size serves as a proxy of 
good quality for the investor. A large fund is not incentivized to aim at superior performance 
since the size attests the good prior performance of the fund. The flow-performance curve that 
previously incentivized fund managers to increase risk now affects negatively to their hunt for 
performance after a certain break point in fund size is reached [Koski and Pontiff (1999)].   
Additionally, management fees based on the size of AUM affect fund’s willingness to 
increase risk. Large asset base ensures a larger flow of annually collected management fees. If 
the regular fee flow is perceived to be large enough, the fund may have incentives to only 
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maintain the current NAV level which means the fund ends up holding a more traditional 
portfolio. Furthermore, the fund companies prefer to set up new high-risk funds rather than 
increase the risk-level of larger, well-established funds [Pollet and Wilson (2008)]. This can 
be a consequence of larger funds being used as “cash cows” for the fund company. 
Analogously, funds that do not have too a dispersed shareholder base are more closely 
monitored by their shareholders. This monitoring effect prevents the fund manager from 
taking risks that are not justified. The capital investment of shareholders can be larger than 
the investment of an average fund investor, and the shareholders are more often sophisticated 
or professional investors. More sophisticated shareholders perceive risk differently and 
tolerate larger variation in the value of their investment. The manager thus has a possibility to 
increase fund’s risk level as the shareholders approve of and better understand this behavior. 
H2:  Funds having performed better in relative terms (excess return) in the previous period 
take less risk during the following period. 
Funds that have had above-average performance receive proportionally larger inflows [Sirri 
and Tufano (1998)]. As the fund has experienced both excellent performance which means 
direct popularity among the investors, and consequent inflow, the manager has an incentive to 
firstly lock in to the profits and secondly, reach for only conventional return levels during the 
following period. Locking in to profits and maintaining average performance level both mean 
that the fund with high probability decreases its risk level to in order to achieve them. 
Inversely, poor-performing funds tend to increase fund volatility [Brown et al (1996)]. 
On a managerial level, the decrease in fund’s risk level after a period of high returns can 
relate to manager’s risk aversion: the manager locks into profits and honors for the high 
performance ranking rather than further gamble with paper gains. If fund manager has 
managed to produce high performance during the period, he probably is not incentivized to 
aim at superior returns in the following period. In some situations, the fund manager can be so 
gratified with his previous accomplishments that the ambition for high returns in the 
following periods receives less emphasis. 
H3: Younger funds commit to more aggressive risk-taking behavior. 
Younger funds are more incentivized to increase risk as they aggressively strive for reaching 
new capital inflows. Above-average performance assures that the fund attracts new capital 
inflows and continues to exist also after the demanding beginning [Brown et al (2001)]. As 
the fund gets older, it has established a position among its peer group and it does not have to 
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struggle anymore for example with survivorship-related problems. Therefore, fund age has 
similar de-incentivizing effects on fund’s risk-taking behavior than fund size.  
In addition, younger funds are more often growth funds that strategically have higher risk 
profiles and adjust their risk levels more aggressively. Since younger funds are often also 
smaller they rarely encounter problems that relate for example to size of ownership, whereas 
increased liquidity or ownership costs can limit larger funds to have more diversified 
portfolios and therefore set the limits for fund’s risk-taking behavior [Pollet and Wilson 
(2008)].  
H4:  Funds having higher minimum investment requirement commit to more aggressive risk-
taking behavior. 
Only wealthy individuals and institutions are able to invest in funds that have higher 
minimum investment requirements. While an unsophisticated investor often reacts irrationally 
towards high risk level and changes in it, sophisticated private investors and institutions have 
a more rational understanding about the concept of risk and about its effects on their portfolio. 
This in turn means that the fund can have higher risk level and adjust its portfolio risk more 
freely as the shareholders perceive the concept of risk differently and accept larger variation 
in their portfolio: the fund is not punished by outflow because of every unsuccessful risky 
investment decision or volatility level that is higher than the market risk levels in general.   
Additionally, funds that have less legal and financial investment restrictions can have higher 
risk profiles and more aggressive risk-taking behavior. These funds more often also require 
that the investor is professional which implicitly sets the assumptions on investor’s wealth 
and therefore also for the required amount of minimum investment. 
H5:  The level of equity fund’s fees is related to its risk-taking behavior. 
Worse performing funds are punished with capital outflows and these outflows incur back-
end loads if the fund charges redemption fees. However, salient front-end-load fees (or 
subscription fee) are negatively related to mutual fund flows [Barber, Odean and Zheng 
(2004)]. Subscription fee is incurred at the very beginning of the investment, before the value 
of investor’s portfolio is exposed to fund’s investment decisions. Funds that maintain 
relatively higher risk levels than their peers have a higher probability of ending up in the best 
performing deciles which in turn, according to previous studies, attracts large capital flows. If 
the fund has established a good track record in consequence of aggressive risk-taking, this 
attracts new capital. New capital in turn accumulates the profits the fund company collects 
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through subscription fees. At the same time, investors have been shown to react irrationally 
towards fees and favor good prior performance over low fees; thus, the managers of these 
funds succeed in attracting inflows regardless of the higher subscription fee level. 
Subscription fee is also charged up-front, so the consequent fund performance does not reduce 
the amount the fund company has managed to collect, and it may thus continue to have higher 
volatility.  
The population of mutual funds having higher redemption fees should include relatively the 
same proportion of poor performing funds as other funds. Previous studies have not found 
significant relationship between redemption fees and fund performance, meaning these funds 
should be punished by capital outflows to the same extent than other poor performing funds. 
However if a fund has higher redemption fee ratio, investors are willing to accept more risk 
and changes in risk; they are not willing to withdraw their investment and incur the salient 
redemption fee. In other words, investors are ready to gamble further and accept the increased 
uncertainty they wouldn’t otherwise accept in order to avoid a certain loss (redemption fee). 
Thus, load fees discourage excessive variation in investor redemptions, as found by Koski and 
Pontiff (1999). As fund managers acknowledge that they are not necessarily punished to the 
same extent because of their larger risk-taking and possible consequent unsuccessful 
investment decisions, they can whether consciously or unconsciously dispose differently 
towards risk-taking. 
Management fee is to cover the expenses that follow from the investment management and 
often, it is related more precisely to expenses that the fund has to incur because it has a 
strategy of active trading.8 The funds having higher management fee ratios should thus have 
risk levels that often differ from the risk level of benchmark indices. The purpose of actively 
managed fund is to outperform its market benchmark index, and this goal induces the fund to 
have often moreover higher than lower risk profile [Gruber (1996)]. High level of 
management fee can signal superior investment skills [Golec (1996)], implying that the risk 
profile of these funds can significantly differ from the risk level of market index. 
  
                                                 
 
8 Inversely, index funds that follow closely the composition of their benchmark index have generally lower 
expenses than equity funds since they trade only based on changes in the respective index. 
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3.4 Hypotheses: risk-taking and belonging to a fund family  
An investor confining all of his investments to a single fund family is exposed to greater total 
portfolio risk as fund families tend to favor whether high or low risk strategies [Elton et al. 
(2007)]. Considering that many fund investors often estimate the diversification effect only on 
a within family level rather than between families level further underlines the fact that the 
possible family effect on funds’ risk-taking behavior should not be underestimated. To 
examine the effect of fund family membership on mutual funds’ risk-taking behavior, I 
present the following last two null hypotheses.  
H6:  Family and non-family funds differ by their risk-taking behavior. 
Mutual funds ultimately serve for the purposes of the fund company as a whole. If the fund 
company has for example 10 funds under management they presumably function in a 
different conditional environment than two funds that are the sole products of another fund 
company. Due to the different complex structures, non-family funds are more flexible than 
family funds functioning in a conditional environment of the family. For example, for smaller 
complexes the scope of activities is expanded for existing funds whereas larger complexes 
prefer allocating new functions by establishing new funds [Elton et al. (2007)]. Also, fund 
families use individual funds to maximize the profits of the overall family by strategically 
transferring performance from a fund to another – this in turn means that the mutual fund 
industry is distorted by fund family organizations [Gaspar, Massa and Matos (2006)].  
H7: High and low risk funds are concentrated in certain families.   
Fund families consisting of multiple funds have generally centralized investment research that 
derives its advantages from economies of scale. This signifies that the funds within the family 
construct and alter their portfolios based on the aggregate universe of possible investment 
opportunities that the internal research generates. The probability that the portfolios of 
individual funds are exposed to e.g. same sectors or geographical regions is therefore higher 
for within family funds than for funds operating in different families. Thus, funds in larger 
complexes have also higher probability of having common holdings with their sibling funds. 
Fund variances are thus not randomly distributed across fund families but funds with low or 
high risk profiles are rather concentrated in the same families [Elton et al. (2007)]. 
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Table 1 
Summary of Hypotheses on Mutual Fund Risk-Taking Behavior 
The following table sums up the seven hypotheses presented in this section. The first five null hypotheses relate 
to the organizational fund characteristics discussed in subsection 2.4 and describe how the variable at issue is 
hypothesized to relate to fund’s risk-taking behavior or, to the relative risk level the fund tends to maintain. The 
6th and 7th hypotheses concentrate on the possibility that fund family membership or belonging to a certain fund 
family is related to fund’s risk profile. Here, the concept ‘risk-taking behavior’ signifies fund’s style to have 
certain risk level, whether more conservative or aggressive, over time from period to period. The seven null 
hypotheses presented below constitute the framework for the discussion and analysis in the rest of the thesis. 
 
   Panel A: Explaining risk-taking behavior by fund characteristics 
 
H1 
 
 
Larger funds take less risk (measured by net asset value or number of shareholders).  
     
H2 
 
Funds having performed better in relative terms (excess return) in the previous period 
take less risk during the following period. 
H3 
 
Younger funds commit to more aggressive risk-taking behavior. 
H4 
 
 
Funds having higher minimum investment requirement commit to more aggressive 
risk-taking behavior. 
H5 
 
 
The level of equity fund’s fees (subscription, redemption, management) is related to 
its risk-taking behavior. 
Panel B: Explaining risk-taking behavior by fund family membership 
H6 
 
Family and non-family funds differ by their risk-taking behavior. 
 
H7 
 
 
High and low risk funds are concentrated in certain families.   
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4 METHODS 
To analyze the risk-taking behavior of mutual funds, I apply two methods that follow the 
framework of hypotheses presented in the previous section. The first method is used to 
analyze the relationship between fund characteristics and risk-taking behavior. The second 
method examines the role of fund family membership in funds’ risk-taking behavior. For 
estimating the level of risk-taking, I construct a modification of the method used by Brown et 
al. (2001) in order to better address the nature of risk-taking behavior and perspectives of this 
study, issues that will be discussed in the next sections. The methodology applied to examine 
the risk-taking behavior of fund families is consistent with the one used by Elton et al. (2007).  
In the next sections, I first describe the methods and variables that are employed to quantify 
the risk-taking behavior of mutual funds in terms of fund characteristics and fund family 
membership. Also the model which I apply to examine the determinants of risk-taking 
behavior is presented. Finally, subsection 4.3 discusses the methodological limitations.  
4.1 Measuring risk-taking behavior across equity funds 
4.1.1 Measuring risk-taking behavior by simple fund volatility 
I measure the level of funds’ risk-taking, or risk-taking behavior, by two variables. First, I use 
simple volatility of daily returns to examine if a fund employs conservative or aggressive risk-
taking behavior. As shown in Equation 1, fund volatility is calculated as the standard 
deviation of daily fund returns: 
(1) Simple volatility ሺSVሻ = ߪ௜,௔ ൌ ට∑ሺ௫ି ௫ҧሻ
మ
ሺ௡ିଵሻ  
 
where ߪ௜,௔ is the annualized volatility of fund i in year a, a figure obtained from the dataset. 
Volatility is widely used in previous academic studies to examine the risk-taking behavior of 
funds [see e.g. Brown et al (1996), Brown et al (2001), Busse (2001) and Elton et al. (2007)], 
although its employment as the sole initial measure – and constructed variables of it – may 
present some limitations. Volatility as a risk measure and its limitations will be discussed in 
more depth in the following sections. 
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In order to match the annualized volatility figures with monthly observations of variables 
measuring fund characteristics, Equation 2 is exploited to scale down volatility to monthly 
figure: 
(2) ߪ௜,௧     ൌ      ߪ௜,௔ ൈ  ඥሺ1/12) 
 
where ߪ௜,௧ is the monthly volatility of fund i in period t. 
4.1.2 Measuring risk-taking behavior by market-adjusted volatility 
As a second measure to examine the risk-taking behavior, I employ a modification of the 
variable used by several studies [e.g. Brown et al. (2001)]9, or a modification of tracking 
error, as generally denoted. The measure is market-adjusted and takes into consideration that 
the sample equity funds operate in different markets. The definition of the second risk 
measure, henceforth denoted as Relative volatility (RV), is shown in Equation 3.                    
(3) ܴ݈݁ܽݐ݅ݒ݁ ݒ݋݈ܽݐ݈݅݅ݐݕ ሺܴܸሻ     ൌ      ఙ೔,೟ఙ೘,೟ 
 
where ߪ௜,௧  is the realized standard deviation of fund i daily returns in period t and ߪ௠,௧ is the 
volatility of comparable market index m returns in the same period. 
Relative volatility is employed, instead of tracking error, due to the time-nature of mutual 
fund’s risk-taking behavior. The main difference between relative volatility and risk variables 
used in prior studies is that for RV, the monthly volatility of daily returns for fund i is first 
calculated and only then the ratio of fund volatility to market index volatility is measured; 
inversely, prior studies use the volatility of excess returns between daily fund and market 
index returns. I argue that the justification for RV variable relies on the fact that fund’s 
investment decisions that relate to general risk-taking behavior, and are more strategic, are not 
realized on a daily basis (as measured by e.g. tracking error) but need a longer period of 
examination. For example, few large realized daily excess returns during a one-month period 
cannot be directly derived to stem from the strategic risk-taking behavior of the fund. For the 
purpose of studying the general risk-taking behavior of funds, it is thus justified to measure 
                                                 
 
9 For example Brown et al. (2001) examine the level of risk-taking as the variance of excess returns between 
monthly fund returns and market benchmark index returns, Risk ൌ  ݒܽݎ ሺݎ௜,௧ െ ݎ௠,௧ሻ. 
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the risk-taking behavior as long-term behavior rather than in terms of daily deviations, that 
may not have much to do with the strategic motivations of the fund. 
The two measures presented above are applied in the regression model (presented in the next 
Subsection 4.1.3) to examine how the organizational fund characteristics relate to fund’s risk-
taking behavior. Moreover, the objective of the risk measures is to examine over time if 
certain type of funds can be shown to consistently have lower or higher risk levels than their 
comparison group – and inversely, if it is possible to estimate how a fund ranks among its 
peer group by its risk profile by only analyzing salient fund characteristics, or variables.  
4.1.3 Regression model: Risk-taking and fund characteristics 
To examine the relation of fund characteristics to mutual fund risk-taking behavior, I employ 
multivariate ordinary least square (OLS) regression. I measure fund’s risk-taking behavior 
(risk level) as a function of the following eight variables: ln of asset size (AUM)10, fund age in 
months (AGE), fund’s prior period excess return (EXRET 1-MTH), management fee 
(MGMTFEE), the amount of minimum investment requirement (MININV), redemption fee 
(REDFEE), number of shareholders (OWNERS) and subscription fee (SUBSFEE). The 
explained variable in the regression is risk-taking which is measured with the two previously 
presented risk-taking variables, simple and relative volatility. 
A following initial11 regression model is applied: 
(4) ࡾࡵࡿࡷ െ ࢀ࡭ࡷࡵࡺࡳ ࡹࡱ࡭ࡿࢁࡾࡱ  ൌ  ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵ lnሺܣܷܯ௧ሻ ൅ ߚଶሺܯܩܯܶܨܧܧ௧ሻ ൅ ߚଷሺܷܵܤܵܨܧܧ௧ሻ ൅
                           ߚସሺܴܧܦܨܧܧ௧ሻ ൅ ߚହ(AGEt) +ߚ଺ሺܧܴܺܧܶ 1 െܯܶܪ௧ିଵሻ൅ ߚ଻ሺܱܹܰܧܴܵ௧ሻ ൅   ߚ଼ ሺܯܫܰܫܰ ௧ܸሻ ൅ ߝ௧ 
 
where ߝ௧  is the model error term. For risk measures that are calculated for a one-month 
period, the organizational fund variables are measured at the end of each month t. The prior 
performance variable is measured at time point t – 1. 
As there are no previous studies conducted with the mentioned eight model variables, I use a 
process called backward elimination12 in order to test if it is justified to include all these 
variables in the model. Thus, backward elimination along the examination of regressor 
                                                 
 
10 Monetary values in fund data in the dataset are stated in Finnish marks before January 1999. These values are 
converted to euros by using the exchange rate of 5.94573. 
11 The model and included variables are further discussed in Section 6. 
12 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stepwise_regression 
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correlations is applied in Section 6 to examine which regressors will be included to the final 
model.   
4.2 Fund families and risk-taking behavior 
To analyze if the risk-taking behavior of mutual funds is related to fund’s belonging to a fund 
family, I employ two methods that follow the hypotheses presented in section 3. The first 
method studying the risk-taking differences of family and non-family funds is related to the 
regression model, and is simply the family dummy applied in the regression model (presented 
in Subsection 4.1.3). The second method examines the risk-taking differences across fund 
families and is consistent with the method used by Elton et al. (2007). 
4.2.1 Measuring fund family membership effect on risk-taking 
To examine if the risk-taking behavior differs between family and non-family funds, I employ 
a family dummy (FAMILY) as the ninth explaining variable in the regression model presented 
in the previous section. The family dummy denotes for 1 if the fund is managed by a fund 
company functioning under a retail bank operating in Finland, otherwise 0.  
Funds of foreign fund families are defined as non-family funds as the dataset does not 
necessarily cover all the funds belonging to the family. Also funds of smaller fund companies 
that do not have a retail bank background are denoted as non-family funds originating from 
the fact that these companies have fairly narrow distribution channels compared to funds of 
retail banks’ fund management companies. The framework is chosen since the retail bank-
backed funds are significantly more popular in Finland than non-bank funds, measured both 
by assets under management and by the number of shareholders. Also, service providers 
offering simultaneously retail banking services have continuously the advantage of attracting 
fund investors due to the service package covering both banking and investing services; for 
the investor, this means decreased search costs since he doesn’t have to go outside the bank in 
order to find investment opportunities [Sirri and Tufano (1998)].  
The inclusion of the dummy and the examination of family membership effect are justified 
since the importance of distribution channel has been found to be highly significant in the 
Finnish mutual fund market [see e.g. Knuutila, Puttonen and Smythe (2007)]. As family and 
non-family funds can be hypothesized to differ by their organizational characteristics, family 
membership should thus have effect on fund’s risk-taking behavior. 
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4.2.2 Measuring risk concentration in fund families 
The second method is applied to examine if high and low risk funds are clustered into certain 
fund families. From the aggregate sample, I separate the families that are managed by a retail 
bank-backed fund company operating in Finland. The final sample for examining the risk 
concentration in fund families consists of nine families whose funds are sold through a retail 
bank and managed by a fund company that essentially operates under the retail bank in 
question. 
The purpose is to analyze the differences in variance across fund families. I first sort out the 
median relative volatility observation for each period t 13. Second, I denote each observation 
with a relative volatility above (below) the median as HIGH (LOW) risk observation in the 
respective period. The observations are then grouped to family subsamples. Then, I examine 
if the distribution for HIGHs and LOWs in a fund family is different from the one expected 
by chance. If low and high risk funds are randomly assigned to different fund families, the 
following normally distributed test statistic can be applied [Elton et al. (2007)]14: 
(5)                           ܼ ൌ ሺ∑  ሺ ௚ܶ,௛ு௛ୀଵ െ ∑ ܧൣ ௚ܶ,௛൧ு௛ୀଵ ሻ / ට∑ ܸܣܴ ሺ ௚ܶ,௛ሻு௛ୀଵ  
where 
 
(6)                       ௚ܶ,௛ ൌ ሺ ௚ܻ,௛ െ ଵଶ ݃ሻଶ 
 
(7)                       ܧ ൣ ௚ܶ,௛൧ ൌ ݒܽݎ൫ ௚ܻ,௛൯ ൌ   ௚ସ 
 
(8)       ܸܣܴሾ ௚ܶ,௛ሿ ൌ   ݒܽݎሺ ௚ܻ,௛ െ ଵଶ כ ݃ሻଶ ൌ  
௚ሺ௚ିଵሻ
଼  
 
௚ܻ,௛ denotes for the number of HIGHs obtained for fund family h when there are g funds in 
the family. A two tailed t-test is run in order to examine the possible concentration of risk into 
certain fund families.  
                                                 
 
13 Elton et al. (2007) use simply standard deviation to sort out LOW and HIGH risk observations. I apply relative 
volatility as the sample contains equity funds with different geographical concentrations. The relative volatility 
measure levels down the market-related risk component in volatility and emphasizes the part of volatility that the 
fund has materialized over general market volatility during the period.  
14 For more detailed derivation of Elton’s test statistic, see Appendix A. 
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The funds are defined as being in the same family if they have the same management 
company. Nine subsamples fulfilling the requirements set for the sample size are sorted out 
from the aggregate sample and henceforth, are separately denoted as Family N, where N ϵ 
[1,9]. Each management company (family) is part of a retail bank operating in Finland. Many 
families have grown significantly in the beginning of the 21st century and before that include 
fairly low number of member funds, which is why I examine risk concentration within 
families only for the period from 01/2002 to 7/2009. 
The disadvantage of the family analysis is that the family subsamples are fairly small, a 
characteristic that will be addressed when analyzing the results. Elton et al. (2007) study the 
risk concentration for fund groups having separate investment objectives; as for my analysis, I 
do not separate funds with different objectives in order to preserve valid number of funds for 
families. In turn, I use relative volatility measure to proportion the risk level of sample funds. 
The measure maintains a similar perspective for LOW and HIGH risk comparison across 
families than the method of Elton et al. and at the same time takes into consideration the 
possible style differences of the sample equity funds. For a point of comparison, Elton et al. 
calculates the test statistic also for all funds with different objectives by using standard 
deviation and still finds statistically significant risk clustering in fund families. 
4.3 Methodological limitations 
4.3.1 Discussion on the validity of risk-taking measures 
There exists several methods like multivariate regression15 or style measures of risk, such as 
high-minus-low (HML) factor, small-minus-big (SMB) factor and momentum (UMD) factor, 
to be exploited in a study on mutual funds’ risk-taking behavior [see e.g. Busse (2001) and 
Ammann and Verhofen (2007)]. These measures would serve for breaking down between the 
components of risk and concentrate on the active risk funds are taking, whereas analysis 
based on volatility does not break down between the actual reasons for risk deviation. 
Unfortunately, the Finnish database which I use in this study does not provide the information 
for the calculation of variables and there is no public database available that would contain 
funds’ equity holdings by stock. However as mentioned previously, the volatility is widely 
                                                 
 
15 Busse (2001) employes a single-index time-series regression to model fund’s return, defined as ܴ௣௧ ൌ  ߙ௣,௧ ൅
 ߚ௣,௧ܴ௠,௧ ൅ ߝ௣,௧. He measures fund’s risk level as the standard deviation of model residuals (ߝ௣,௧). 
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used in previous studies to measure funds’ risk-taking in relation to market index volatility 
[see e.g. Brown et al. (1996), Busse (2001) and Brown et al. (2001)]. 
Mainly due to the characteristics of risk-taking behavior, the additional variable for measuring 
risk-taking based on simple fund and market volatilities (relative volatility) is constructed – 
whereas prior studies have used the variance of excess returns. I justify the usage of relative 
volatility by the fact that the monthly volatility reflects better the strategic risk-taking 
decisions of fund than the estimation of funds return deviation from the index on a daily basis. 
As relative volatility is a new, constructed variable, I also use simple volatility as a risk-taking 
measure, so I am able to compare “raw” risk-taking behavior and market-adjusted risk-taking 
behavior; or in other words, how much fund’s risk level has deviated from the one of its 
market benchmark index.  
4.3.2 Comments on the restricted sample size of fund family analysis 
For the examination of risk concentration in families, the small size of the Finnish fund 
market signifies that the sample size is fairly restricted in size which may affect the reliability 
of results. However, a closer examination of the risk-taking of family versus non-family funds 
is highly justified as firstly, to my best knowledge there exist only few academic studies on 
the subject, each conducted with US data, and secondly, since the Finnish fund market is 
significantly dominated by the retail bank-backed families and among them, by the few 
largest families.  
The main problem present in the sample is mainly the fairly low number of fund members for 
other families than for the few largest ones. However, Elton’s test statistic uses median to 
rank funds as LOW or HIGH risk funds, so the extreme volatility observations in the 
aggregate family sample do not distort the figure (as they would in case of mean figure, for 
example). Also, each family contains all family’s observations, so it is the actual family 
population for the sample period and not a sample of it – the observations thus describe the 
actual situation and investment opportunities/outcomes of an investor investing in funds of a 
single fund family. 
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Table 2 
Two Methods for Measuring the Relation of Risk-Taking Behavior and Fund 
Characteristics 
This table presents the variables that are used to examine the risk-taking behavior of funds. The variables are 
measured as a function of organizational fund variables in model RISK-TAKING MEASURE = β0 + β1 ln(AUMt) 
+ β2 (MGMTFEEt) + β3 (SUBSFEEt) + β4 (REDFEEt) + β5(AGEt) + β6 (EXRET 1-MTHt-1) + β7 (OWNERSt) + β8 
(MININVt) + β9 (FAMILY) ൅ ߝ௧. For simple and relative volatility (risk measures), the benchmark employed in 
calculation and time period of measurement is defined. The variables do not address whether the lower (higher) 
risk level of fund results for example from higher volatility of underlying stocks or if they originate from 
strategically active portfolio management. In theory, the investor should be indifferent to the cause of risk 
deviation that affects his wealth and consider only how these risk changes correlate with risk changes in his 
overall portfolio. Therefore if anything, the two risk measures presented above do not set assumptions for the 
source of the risk level but are rather used to estimate the implications of risk levels from investor’s perspective 
on the investor’s portfolio in aggregate. 
 
Variable 
Measure of 
Variation 
 
Benchmark 
Time Period of 
Measurement Description 
Simple volatility ߪ No benchmark Monthly 
 
Standard deviation of fund’s daily raw 
returns. 
Relative volatility ߪ Market index Monthly 
 
Simple fund volatility to market index 
volatility. 
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5 DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
In this section, I first present the aggregate dataset and describe the samples obtained both for 
fund characteristic and fund family analysis. Second, I define the market benchmark indices 
used for the calculation of variables measuring the risk-taking behavior. The rest of this 
section presents descriptive statistics and analysis of sample characteristics, both in terms of 
fund characteristics, family attributes and risk-taking variables.    
5.1 Data 
The dataset employed in the thesis is obtained from the monthly fund reports of the Finnish 
Association of Mutual Funds. The reports include monthly data on funds that are sold in 
Finland, and provide information on such variables as fund size, fees and return and risk 
characteristics, for example. As the dataset contains nearly all funds provided to Finnish 
investors, it includes observations on funds managed both by domestic and foreign mutual 
fund companies. From the dataset, I extract data on monthly fund and benchmark index 
volatilities, organizational fund variables defined previously and on one-month return data for 
funds. For funds having multiple share classes (i.e. growth and profit), I exclude the other 
fund class that has fewer shareholders.16  
Several funds present incomplete data on fund characteristics during the sample months. For 
the analysis of these characteristics and risk-taking, I exclude all observations that do not 
contain complete information on required variables. The incomplete data is mainly provided 
by foreign mutual fund companies who are not obliged to provide with all information 
presented on the Mutual Fund Reports. However, the exclusion of these observations does not 
decrease sample validity since the analysis concentrates on the risk-taking behavior across 
equity funds, regardless of funds’ home country. The final sampled dataset contains 27,372 
observations for a period of over ten years, from January 1998 to July 2009. 
For the analysis of risk-taking within and across family funds, I further exclude all foreign 
funds. The limitation does affect the sample size in a restrictive way but is indispensable, as 
foreign families rarely offer all their funds for the Finnish market – the within-family 
comparison of these family funds thus is not valid as all the observations of these families are 
                                                 
 
16 Different fund share classes invest in the same portfolio so a duplicate entry of them would bias the sample. 
For a large majority of funds having two share classes in the sample, growth shares are significantly larger in 
terms of shareholder base and are also more regularly traded than the profit class shares. 
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not included and presumably, the subsample drawn from the family would not describe the 
risk-taking of the family in aggregate. In turn, the sample for family analysis does not suffer 
from the problem of incomplete observations as data on only returns and volatilities is 
required. The final sample for fund family analysis contains all equity funds belonging to a 
fund family managed by a retail bank-backed fund company (denoted as family funds) or by 
another fund company (denoted as non-family funds) being a member of The Finnish 
Association of Mutual Funds17. The family and non-family fund samples together total to 
18,903 monthly observations.  
Of broad objective categories, the analysis concentrates on equity funds, a limitation 
consistent with several previous studies. The final sample includes all equity funds with 
adequate data regardless of their geographical investment strategy18, containing equity funds 
that invest in Finland, Nordic countries, Europe, North America, Japan, Asia, emerging 
markets and globally. All index, specialized, money market, hedge and balanced funds are 
excluded from the aggregate sample as presumably, their fund characteristics and thus 
incentives for risk-taking behaviour can differ significantly from the ones of normal equity 
funds. 
  
                                                 
 
17 For more information, see http://www.sijoitusrahastot.fi/. 
18 As presented in Section 4 – Methods, the risk levels are defined as the ratio of fund volatility to benchmark 
index volatility in order to smooth out specific systematic risk components of different geographical markets.  
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Table 3 
Annual Characteristics of the Aggregate Sample, 1998–2009 
Summary statistics of the sample on an annual basis are presented. The table reports yearly figures for the 
aggregate number of monthly observations and funds, percentage of funds that belonged to a family in respective 
year, average total net assets TNA (million €), average 1-month raw return (ri) and average 1-month excess 
return (ri – rm). The number of funds is measured at the end of the last month of each year and the number of 
observations sums up all the monthly fund observations during the sample year in question. In 2009, the 
observations cover only the period from January to July, as July was the last data month available at the time of 
the research. On average, when funds’ average 1-month simple return is lower, e.g. during economic downturns, 
funds tend to underperform their benchmark indices, meaning the average 1-month excess return is lower. One 
explanation could be sample funds’ higher beta compared to their benchmark indices’ betas (more aggressive 
risk-taking of actively managed equity funds). The average fund size (TNA) between years 1998–2009 reflects 
well the increase in mutual fund investments, whereas also the economic cycles can be seen in the annual 
average fund sizes; for 2008, the average fund size decreases over 40 % from the figures of 2007, due to 
simultaneous economic downturn and consequent capital redemptions experienced during the second half of 
2008. In the sample, a fund is denoted as a family fund if it belongs to a fund company backed by a retail bank 
operating in Finland, otherwise a non-family fund. 
  
Year 
No of  
Obs. 
No. of 
 Funds 
Percentage of 
Family Funds
Average TNA  
(m€) 
Avg. 1-th  
Simple Return, % 
Avg. 1-mth  
Excess Return, % 
1998 595 69 43.5 9.32 0.13 -0.99 
1999 987 115 37.8 17.25 3.50 1.03 
2000 1,549 172 34.9 19.92 0.61 0.33 
2001 1,922 218 36.3 13.74 -1.80 -0.12 
2002 2,106 229 42.5 50.60 -1.94 -0.18 
2003 2,507 238 43.6 41.53 0.94 0.58 
2004 2,651 257 42.9 62.38 0.60 -0.05 
2005 2,905 287 43.2 80.01 2.32 0.25 
2006 2,976 313 43.1 100.63 1.43 0.12 
2007 3,314 349 45.5 110.70 0.29 -0.14 
2008 3,368 424 35.2 64.89 -2.77 -0.39 
2009 2,492 308 48.6 65.65 -0.01 -0.00 
 Total 27,372 2,979 n/a n/a n/a n/a 
 
During the sample period, the number of funds increased from 69 to 308, whereas the number 
of monthly observations during a year rose with a similar rate from 595 (1998) to 3,368 
(2008) observations, reflecting well the fast development of the mutual fund industry in 
Finland. The median size of the fund increased from 4.1 million € in 1998 to 32.2 million 
euros in 2009, respectively, an increase deriving both from the increased interest of Finnish 
investors to mutual funds and establishment of larger, foreign funds to Finnish markets. On 
the other hand, the fairly small median size of fund during the sample period indicates that 
there are many small funds operating in the Finnish fund market. On the macroeconomic 
level, the sample statistics also reveal the dramatic impact of the economic downturn in year 
2008, as the average fund TNA decreases over 40 % from year 2007. 
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Table 4 
Summary Statistics for Organizational Fund Characteristics  
The table presents descriptive statistics of the aggregate sample in terms of organizational fund variables. The 
figures are calculated from the aggregate sample containing 27,372 monthly observations between years 1998–
2009. For each variable, a minimum, maximum, mean and median observation is presented in addition to the 
standard deviation of the observations. All the observations are monthly, indicating that for example, the 
maximum fund size during the sample period was 1.72 billion euro (measured at the end of sample month) or 
that the worst-performing fund during the sample period managed to generate a monthly raw return of –58.81 %. 
 
Variable Min. Mean Median Max. Std. Dev. 
TNA (€ million) 0.00 63.46 24.98 1,718.52 108.85 
Fund age (months) 0.00 81.96 66.00 353.00 62.24 
1-month simple return (%) -58.81 0.07 0.60 50.20 7.16 
1-month excess return (%) -57.39 0.02 0.03 42.20 4.43 
Management fee (%) 0.00 1.56 1.58 2.60 0.66 
Subscription fee (%) 0.00 1.06 1.00 6.50 0.65 
Redemption fee (%) 0.00 0.88 1.00 5.00 0.42 
Minimum investment (€) 0.00 29,171 500 1,680,000 139,353 
Number of shareholders 0.00 7,472 1,215 518,174 22,822 
 
 
The absolute complex size of Finnish fund companies increased significantly during the 
sample period, but the relative number of Finnish family funds in the aggregate sample 
remained around 40 % for each sample year. The evolution implies that the complex size of 
Finnish fund families grew relatively as fast as the number of entries of Finnish non-family or 
foreign funds. In 2009 (January–July), the proportion of family funds in the sample reached 
its peak by over 48 % of all observations. 
The average fund in the aggregate sample has a TNA of 63.5 million euro, whereas the largest 
manages an asset base of 1.72 billion euro. Measured by the number of owners, the largest 
fund has more than 518,000 shareholders, whereas the median fund has an owner base of only 
1,215 shareholders. The oldest fund in the sample holds on operation history of 353 months (~ 
29.4 years); still, for these funds the sample includes data only for the period that fits to the 
sample period range of 1998–2009 and that was included in the original dataset. If the fund 
existed before appearing in the dataset, this history is not included to the sample.  
The most expensive fund in the sample announces to charge a subscription fee of 6.5 %. Also 
the average subscription fee proves to be 1.06 %, compared to the fairly low mean redemption 
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fee of 0.88 %. The figures indicate that capital inflows are addressed with larger front-end 
loads19 than redemptions; namely, this would imply that the barriers to exit for the 
shareholder in terms of bad performance were lower. 
Based on the significant deviations present in fund characteristics, the sample is fairly 
heterogeneous and thus serves well the purposes of the analysis. The sample period includes 
also observations for periods of both economic boom and downturn, so I am able to capture 
funds’ risk-taking behavior in both scenarios. 
5.2 Distinct characteristics between family and non-family funds 
Funds belonging to Finnish fund families have two distinctive features. First, family funds 
operate in a special environment and in a market largely dominated by the operations of larger 
retail banks. Capital flows for bank-managed funds in Finland prove to follow totally different 
patterns than for example the high-Morningstar rated funds in the US market [Knuutila et al. 
(2007)]. Second, a large majority of the shareholder base of these families consists of Finnish 
private and institutional investors. Consequently, the population of family funds offers a 
special environment for the study of both fund market characteristics and Finnish investor 
behavior.  
The mean family fund in the sample has 12 months shorter operating history than the average 
non-family fund and the difference is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. The 
difference can whether indicate that fund families in general have simply started to supply 
new funds at a later stage of the sample period to the market or that family funds are more 
easily liquidated/terminated than non-family funds. Since the survivorship of a family is not 
highly dependent on one, for example bad-performing fund, families may have an incentive to 
terminate/liquidate/merge these funds faster. On the other hand, non-family fund companies 
have a smaller number of funds under management or even in some cases only one fund, so 
they in turn are induced to continue even though the fund would perform relatively poorly. It 
should be also noted that the same flow-performance curve should apply for both family and 
non-family funds. Analogously, one can hypothesize that this could induce family- and non-
family funds to engage in different type of risk-taking behavior. 
  
                                                 
 
19 The fee component levied on the subscription at the time of purchase. 
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Table 5 
Differences in Mean Characteristics of Family and Non-Family Funds 
Organizational fund characteristics and differences in them between family and non-family funds are reported. 
The observations constitute two subsamples, totaling 18,903 observations. Subsamples are formed based on 
whether the fund belongs to a fund company of a retail bank (family fund) or another fund company (non-family 
fund) operating in Finland. For each variable of interest, each row presents the subsample-wide median value, 
the first column reporting the figures for family funds and the second for non-family funds, respectively. The 
third column shows the p-value of the tests estimating if the two means are equal or if the belonging to a fund 
family does not explain the differences between the values of presented variables. As the two subsamples form 
the population for all observations in question, z-statistic is used to examine if family and non-family funds 
differ by their average fund characteristics. The differences shown below provide a useful starting point for the 
analysis of possible differences in risk-taking behavior between family- and non-family funds.  
                 
  
Family Funds 
(Median) 
Non-Family Funds 
(Median) 
p-Val. Difference of  
Mean Values 
1-month simple return (%) 0.66 0.61 0.436 
      
1-month excess return (%) 0.03 0.04 0.939 
      
TNA (€ million) 50.6 29.9 <0.001 
      
Fund age (mths) 60.0 70.0 <0.001 
      
Minimum investment (€) 100 5,000 <0.001 
      
Number of shareholders 4,034 872 <0.001 
      
Management fee (%) 1.60 1.50 <0.001 
      
Subscription fee (%) 1.00 1.00 0.038 
      
Redemption fee (%) 1.00 1.00 <0.001 
    
Number of observations 9,221 9,682 n/a 
  
 
The median family fund has smaller minimum investment requirement than the median non-
family fund. The lower threshold of accessibility for family funds can affect the fact that the 
average non-family fund also has significantly smaller shareholder base. Considering the 
special characteristics of the sample and Finnish fund markets, the difference may also be 
explained by higher search costs that the investor has to incur while searching for a suitable 
non-family fund, whereas fund families are easily reached due to their wide-spread 
distribution channels and linkage with retail banking services. 
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Table 6 
Summary Statistics on Sample Fund Families 
The table shows summary statistics of the sample fund families. The nine families present the subsamples that 
are sorted out from the aggregate sample based on the retail bank background of the family: each family reported 
below is managed by a fund company that is part of a retail bank operating in Finland. The first column shows 
the total number of monthly observations for all funds belonging to each family and the second reports the 
aggregate number of different funds in the family during the sample period. The third column shows the average 
net asset value of a fund in the family and the fourth presents the average monthly excess return (ri – rm). The last 
column presents the average risk level (monthly standard deviation of daily returns) for the funds in the family. 
The sample collected for analyzing fund families covers the period from 1/2002 to 7/2009 since 1) earlier 
observations of fund number for smaller families before this are fairly small and 2) retail banks have started to 
exploit mutual funds more aggressively only after the turn of the 21st century. The family subsample consists of 
9,221 observations in total. 
                
  No. of No. of Average Average Average 
Family subsample  Obs. Funds* TNA, m€ Excess Return (%) Risk (%) 
 
Family 1  501 13 49.5 -0.13 5.29 
 
Family 2  560 25 55.9 0.07 6.13 
 
Family 3  1,835 50 103.4 -0.06 5.29 
 
Family 4  2,238 55 127.3 -0.06 5.97 
 
Family 5  2,657 55 87.6 -0.07 5.78 
 
Family 6  157 6 10.6 -0.08 5.90 
 
Family 7  270 8 34.4 -0.03 4.88 
 
Family 8  694 21 45.2 0.16 5.43 
 
Family 9  309 12 24.6 0.05 5.34 
 -   
  
* The total number of different funds for a family during the sample period. 
 
If the number of shareholder base for family and non-family funds is compared, the median 
family fund has a shareholder base over four times larger (4,034 vs. 872 shareholders) than 
the median fund in the non-family subsample. An average family fund charges a subscription 
fee of 2 basis points higher than the one charged by the mean non-family fund. Also in terms 
of management and redemption fees, the average family fund appears to charge more than the 
average non-family fund. Bank-managed family funds are evidently able to attract more 
investors in absolute numbers and their average size difference to non-family funds is 
statistically significant, although their fee structure appears to be of higher level. Interestingly, 
the average non-family fund performs better measured with monthly excess return although 
the mean family fund has a positive raw return. Ultimately, the average excess return for both 
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samples is negative, indicating both family and non-family funds have hard times beating 
their benchmark indices.  
Family and non-family funds seem to significantly differ by their characteristics. I argue the 
difference largely originates from the large role of the distribution channels of family funds 
and the consequent higher search costs that the investor will have to incur if he decides to go 
outside the family. The acknowledgement of this in turn induces mutual fund companies to 
engage in certain type of strategies. If fund characteristics prove to explain the risk-taking 
behavior of mutual funds in compliance with the presented eight first null hypotheses, it 
further implicates that the risk-taking behavior between family and non-family funds should 
also differ. 
5.3 Survivorship biases 
The rapid growth of the Finnish mutual fund industry and especially the increase in foreign 
funds marketed in Finland signify that the sample employed in this study contains special 
characteristics. First, the median fund in the sample holds an operating history of less than six 
years since the number of funds in the industry has grown fast during the recent years. 
Second, as for foreign funds, the dataset contains only the operating history during which the 
fund has been marketed for Finnish investors, signifying that the sample does not contain the 
aggregate operating history for all foreign funds.20  
In addition, the dataset suffers from survivorship bias as it contains the observations of all 
funds that have been merged or liquidated, but also the observations for funds that have 
ceased to exist during the aggregate sample period. The bias is not however significant in 
terms of validity as I measure the risk-taking at a point in time, not over time or in terms of 
change, and for each point of time, the dataset includes all funds at that time. The inclusion of 
ceased funds is in fact highly justified since it decreases biases that could otherwise exist due 
to the rapid growth of Finnish mutual fund industry.  
  
                                                 
 
20 The Finnish Association of Mutual Funds provides the ratios for fund performance and risk measures that are 
self-calculated in order to assure the comparability of fund data. This presents problem for e.g. combining 
another database to the one used here as firstly, the variables are not necessarily commensurate and secondly, the 
other database should also contain data on organizational fund variables for the same sample of funds. For more 
information, see http://www.sijoitustutkimus.fi/rahastoraportti.shtml. 
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5.4 Market benchmark indices 
The differing risk characteristics of regional markets are taken into account by using 
comparable market benchmark indices. As the variables employed in the thesis are 
constructed on the fund volatility in excess of the volatility in market index and determine a 
large part of the validity of the analysis, it is justified that, considering the characteristics of 
the fund sample, more than one benchmark index is employed. Several previous studies have 
used only single benchmark index like S&P 500 [see e.g. Busse (2001) and Ammann and 
Verhofen (2007)] or constructed style benchmarks [see e.g. Brown et al. (2001)]. However, 
the usage of only one benchmark to evaluate fund’s excess volatility does not take into 
account funds with different styles and regional concentrations, distorting the validity of the 
benchmark as the actual benchmark index.  
Thus, I apply multiple benchmark indices, identical to the ones used by the Finnish 
Association of Mutual Funds in the Mutual Fund Reports. The benchmark indices applied are 
provided by MSCI Barra21 and widely used by portfolio managers; in addition, equity funds 
investing in Finland are benchmarked to OMX Helsinki Cap Index22. Indices are of total 
return basis and they assume that all dividends and other distributions are re-invested into the 
portfolio. Benchmark indices applied are the official indices used in the monthly published 
Mutual Fund Reports, and are allocated to individual funds based on each fund’s regional or 
other investment strategy. For each index, annualized volatilities are obtained from the 
Mutual Fund Reports and scaled back to monthly volatilities.  
The benchmark indices employed are not the actual benchmarks used by funds themselves; 
however, MSCI indices in general are widely used among portfolio managers on a global 
scale. Here, the purpose of using joint benchmark indices is to proportion fund’s risk level to 
the general risk level in the particular geographical market; in fact, the method is even more 
justified compared to the previous academic studies that have used common benchmark 
indices rather than individual benchmark index of separate markets. Furthermore, benchmark 
indices used by funds themselves are not valid indices for measuring absolute and objective 
                                                 
 
21 The indices are gross benchmarks and are therefore suitable for adjusting the risk levels of funds that report 
their figures as dividends-re-invested. For more information, see http://www.mscibarra.com/. 
22 The index was called HEX Portfolio Index before January 2002. For more information, see 
http://www.omxnordicexchange.com/. 
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performance (and thus risk levels) as they often are composite indices or otherwise 
subjectively chosen to promote fund’s internal purposes. 
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6 RESULTS 
In this section, I present the quantitative results of the analysis based on the seven null 
hypotheses of the thesis. The analysis is divided into three parts: the first one concentrates on 
discussing the implications of the initial regression model on the relation of fund 
characteristics and risk-taking, developing and arguing on the form of the final model applied 
in this thesis. The second part employs the final regression model to analyze the relationship 
of fund characteristics and risk-taking, discussing whether the first five hypotheses can be 
accepted. The third part focuses on the differences of family and non-family funds’ risk-
taking and inductively, on the risk-taking differences across fund families; the section 
analyzing the effect of family membership is based on the sixth and seventh null hypotheses.  
In the end of Section 6, I shortly contemplate the main findings from fund investor’s 
perspective and discuss the implications between them and the dominant role of family funds 
in Finland.  
6.1 Relation of fund characteristics and risk-taking behavior – Initial 
model 
There exists several practical and theoretical motivations for why the nine fund characteristics 
of the initial model can be seen to be closely related to incentives for risk-taking. As shown in 
correlation Table 7, the original model for the causality of nine initial fund characteristics and 
risk-taking behavior has a possibility of encountering problems with multicollinearity. Table 7 
shows that there exists three cases in which the correlation coefficients is more than 0.3; the 
relationship between variables measuring fund size (total net assets and number of 
shareholders) and the management fee versus both subscription and redemption fee variable. 
The background for these correlation coefficient figures is more closely examined. 
Variables ln(assets) and number of shareholders (OWNERS) have a correlation coefficient of 
+0.302. However, ln(assets) has a negative correlation with the risk-taking measures whereas 
number OWNERS is positively correlated both with simple and relative volatility. If ln(assets) 
is first solely regressed to the risk-taking measure and after this both ln(assets) and OWNERS 
variables, coefficients or respective t-value for ln(assets) do not change significantly. When 
the aggregate regression is examined in Table 8, it is contradictory that the sign for ln(assets) 
coefficient is negative (–0.052), as suggested by Hypothesis 1, whereas the variable for 
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number of owners has a positive, although really small, coefficient value (< 0.001); this even 
though ln(assets) and OWNERS are positively correlated. 
 52 
 
 
Table 7 
The Correlation Matrix for Risk Measures and Fund Characteristics 
This table reports the correlations between the two risk measures (simple and relative volatility) and the nine explanatory variables. The purpose of the correlation table is to 
represent the interdependence of the model variables in order to detect if the model has a possibility of encountering problems with multicollinearity. The correlations 
between the variables are estimated from the aggregate sample covering the period from January 1998 to July 2009. The sample contains 27,372 observations and includes all 
funds that ceased to exist, merged or were liquidated during the sample period. The inclusion of these observations is justified since they increase the validity of the sample 
and decrease biases that would possibly exist due to the rapid growth of Finnish mutual fund industry and the increase in the amount of foreign funds sold in Finland. The 
correlations between most of the variables are < 0.3, some however > 0.3 [denoted with an asterix (*)] which can be a possible indication of multicollinearity of variables in 
the model. The possible problems between these variables are discussed below in the text. 
 
Variable 
Simple 
Volatility 
Relative 
Volatility ln (assets) Age (mths) 
Prior Excess 
Return 1-mth
Management 
Fee 
Subscription 
Fee 
Redemption 
Fee Owners Mininv Family 
Simple Volatility 1                     
Relative Volatility 0.316* 1                   
ln (assets) –0.156 –0.132 1                 
Age (mths) 0.017 –0.002 0.095 1               
Prior Excess Return 1-mth –0.038 –0.044 0.006 0.012 1             
Management Fee 0.092 –0.003 0.081 0.053 –0.018 1           
Subscription Fee –0.010 –0.054 –0.017 0.043 –0.019 0.302* 1         
Redemption Fee 0.082 –0.008 –0.012 0.001 –0.012 0.423* 0.142 1       
Owners 0.100 0.067 0.302* 0.177 –0.005 0.112 0.138 0.000 1     
Mininv –0.034 –0.024 0.086 0.025 0.004 –0.241 –0.081 –0.225 –0.064 1   
Family –0.070 –0.017 0.219 –0.117 –0.013 0.058 –0.102 0.090 0.051 0.083 1 
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Table 8 
Initial Model: Regressions by Progressively Adding Variables  
This table presents the regressions for the initial model where fund’s risk-taking behavior (relative volatility) is 
explained with all original nine fund variables. The table reports the regression coefficients step by step in order to 
show how the model is developed while the variables are added one by one; the analysis for progressive regressions is 
produced in order to address possible problems of the initial model (i.e. multicollinearity of model variables that was 
observed in correlation matrix, Table 7). Relative volatility is defined as the ratio of monthly fund volatility to monthly 
market index volatility. The coefficient estimates of two-tailed tests and their associated t-values (in parentheses) are 
described for denoted significance levels. The sample consists of 27,372 monthly observations for relative volatility 
(regressand) and fund characteristics (regressors), and covers the period from January 1998 to July 2009. The high 
correlation between fee variables can be observed in Regression 1.–9., where the coefficient and t-values change 
significantly for subscription and redemption fee when management fee variables is introduced to the model. 
 
Variable added 1.–2. 1.–3. 1.–4. 1.–5. 1.–6. 1.–7. 1.–8. 1.–9. 1.–10. 
 
1. Intercept 1.276 1.275 1.269 1.269 1.264 1.314 1.320 1.307 1.345 
(201.8)*** (201.9)*** (175.2)*** (175.2)*** (168.6)*** (144.9)*** (122.9)*** (115.8)*** (118.4)*** 
 
2. ln(assets), m€ –0.039 –0.039 –0.040 –0.039 –0.040 –0.040 –0.040 –0.041 –0.052 
(-22.03)*** (-22.01)*** (-22.08)*** (-21.82)*** (-21.81)*** (-21.78)*** (-21.80)*** (-22.11)*** (-27.05)***
 
3. Prior excess –0.500 –0.502 –0.501 –0.500 –0.513 –0.514 –0.511 –0.502 
return 1-mth (-7.21)*** (-7.23)*** (-7.22)*** (-7.19)*** (-7.40)*** (-7.41)*** (-7.37)*** (-7.30)*** 
4. Age (mths) < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 < -0.001 
 
 
(1.82)* 
 
(1.86)* 
 
(2.19)** 
 
(2.52)** 
 
(2.54)** 
 
(2.33)** 
 
(0.77) 
 
5. Min investment < –0.001 < –0.001 < –0.001 < –0.001 < –0.001 < –0.001
 
 
(-2.18)** 
 
(2.35)** 
 
(-3.06)*** 
 
(-3.25)*** 
 
(-2.49)** 
 
(-0.73) 
 
6. Family dummy 0.016 0.010 0.011 0.010 0.006 
 
 
(2.46)** 
 
(1.58) 
 
(1.71)* 
 
(1.49) 
 
(0.92) 
 
7. Subscription fee –4.556 –4.477 –5.024 –6.294 
 
 
(-9.68)*** 
 
(-9.42)*** 
 
(-10.18)***
 
(-12.73)***
 
8. Redemption fee –0.901 –2.116 –1.260 
 
 
(-1.19) 
 
(-2.61)*** 
 
(-1.56) 
 
9. Mgmt fee 2.224 1.792 
 
 
(4.09)*** 
 
(3.32)*** 
 
10. Owners < 0.001 
    (19.98)*** 
F-value 485.6*** 269.2*** 180.6*** 136.7*** 110.6*** 108.0*** 92.8*** 83.4*** 119.5***
Adj. R2 0.017 0.019 0.019 0.020 0.020 0.023 0.023 0.024 0.038 
Number of obs. 27,372 27,372 27,372 27,372 27,372 27,372 27,372 27,372 27,372 
 
***, **, * denoting the statistical significance at levels 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10, respectively. 
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OWNERS variable is preserved in the final regression model as it appears that it measures different 
concept than ln(assets); first, correlation coefficient of different sign for ln(assets) and risk-taking 
vs. OWNERS and risk-taking implies that the two variables are related with risk-taking behavior due 
to different reasons. Second, Table 8 presenting the regressions by progressively adding the 
variables shows that when introducing OWNERS to the model as the ninth and last variable, the 
coefficient or respective t-value of ln(assets) does not change significantly. Neither do the two 
variables have any higher standard errors when individually or jointly regressed to risk-taking 
measure; both variables are also statistically significant while individually regressed to the risk 
measure, as shown in Appendix B. 
Management fee variable is excluded from the final model. Table 8 strongly indicates that the 
model is exposed to multicollinearity if all three fee variables are included.  The variable has a 
correlation of 0.302 and 0.423 with subscription and redemption fee, respectively. In Table 8, the 
high correlation can be observed in Regression 1.–9.; coefficient and t-values of correlated 
subscription and redemption fees decrease significantly from the previous regression level when 
management fee variable is introduced to the model.  Subscription fee coefficient decreases from –
4.48 to –5.02 and redemption fee coefficient from –0.90 to –2.12. In addition, the redemption fee 
coefficient that is not statistically significant at Regression level 1.–8. becomes significant at the 1 
percent level as management fee variable is introduced. 
In addition, as model variables are individually assessed against the risk-taking measure (see 
Appendix B), family dummy produces contradictory results. Individually regressed to relative 
volatility, family dummy coefficient is negative (–0.017) and statistically significant at the 1 percent 
level, but in the aggregate model in Table 8, produces a positive and statistically insignificant 
coefficient. After a closer examination, ln(assets) appears to be the co-variable that changes the sign 
of family variable, simultaneously inflating respective coefficient and t-values. As the correlation 
between the two variables is 0.219 and the results imply possible problems if both variables are 
included, I exclude family dummy from the final regression. The effect of fund family membership 
is later examined by using other methods in subsection 6.3. 
Appendix B also shows that age variable produces a negative R2 when individually regressed to the 
risk measure, and the age coefficients and their respective t-values develop irrationally in Table 8.  
Due to these results that indicate the age variable moreover to inflate the model than improve it, I 
exclude age variable from the final regression model. 
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Table 9 
Final Model: Regressions by Progressively Adding Variables  
This table presents the final regression model by progressively adding the selected six fund variables. The management 
fee variable observed to inflate the validity of other regressors (due to multicollinearity) is excluded from the final 
model presented below. Also age variable and family dummy are excluded since they appear to deteriorate the model 
and co-variables rather than improve it. The regressions reveal that some variables prove statistical significance in all 
regressions; in fact, all the significant variables in the aggregate model show statistical significance also when they are 
individually regressed to risk-taking measure, so their statistical interpretation is not inflated when all variables are 
included to the regression. Risk-taking is measured in terms of relative volatility which is the ratio of monthly fund 
volatility to market index volatility. The six regressions are conducted by adding the six fund variables progressively to 
the model, in order to show how the final model differs from the initially presented model (Table 8). The results of the 
aggregate/full regression model are also applied as the final ground for the analysis and for testing the hypotheses. The 
coefficient estimates of two-tailed tests and their associated t-values (in parentheses) are described for denoted 
significance levels. The sample consists of 27,372 monthly observations of risk-taking variable (relative volatility) and 
fund variables (characteristics).  
 
Variable added 1.-2. 1.-3. 1.-4. 1.-5. 1.-6. 1.-7. 
1. Intercept 1.276 1.275 1.276 1.325 1.331 1.356 
(201.78)*** (291.94)*** (201:94)*** (163.67)*** (131.89)*** (134.34)*** 
2. ln(assets), m€ –0.039 –0.039 –0.039 –0.039 –0.039 –0.052 
(–22.04)*** (–22.01)*** (–21.74)*** (–21.88)*** (–21.87)*** (–27.29)*** 
3. Prior excess –0.500 –0.500 –0.512 –0.513 –0.506 
return 1-mth (–7.21)*** (–7.20)*** (–7.40)*** (–7.41)*** (–7.36)*** 
4. Min investment < –0.001 < –0.001 < -–0.001 < –0.001 
(–2.15)** (–2.92)*** (–3.07)*** (–1.25) 
5. Subscription fee –4.571 –4.513 –5.929 
(–9.76)*** (–9.56)*** (–12.51)*** 
6. Redemption fee –0.735 –0.175 
(–0.98) (–0.23) 
7. Owners < 0.001 
            (20.3)*** 
F-value 485.6*** 269.2*** 181.0*** 160.1*** 128.2*** 177.1*** 
Adj. R2 0.017 0.019 0.019 0.023 0.023 0.037 
Number of obs. 23,372 23,372 23,372 23,372 23,372 23,372 
 
***, **, * denoting the statistical significance at levels 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10, respectively. 
 
 
The final regression model and selected six fund variables are presented in Table 9, once again with 
progressive regressions in order to show how the final model develops when variables are added. 
The next subsections present and analyze the results of final regression and answer the question of 
whether the five hypotheses on risk-taking and fund characteristics can be accepted. 
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6.2 Fund characteristics and risk-taking behavior – Final model  
Figure 1 shows that equity funds with the lowest volatility levels follow the risk levels of their 
market benchmark indices fairly closely. More than 70 % of the time the realized volatility of low-
risk fund is lower than market volatility in general (RV < 1). In terms of active fund management, 
the difference indicates that whether these actively managed funds target to create lower volatility 
levels than their market benchmark index or they maintain low-risk profiles for some other reason. 
Instead, average-risk equity fund tends to maintain a higher risk level than its benchmark index, 
whereas high-risk fund proves to lock to a risk level that is roughly 1.3x the market index volatility, 
on average. 
Funds with the lowest risk levels (25 % of sample funds with the lowest relative volatility) differ 
from comparable high-risk funds in terms of fund characteristics, as reported in Table 10. The 
median high-risk fund is over 40 % smaller in asset size than the median low-risk fund, implying 
that the managers of larger portfolios commit to more conservative risk-taking behaviour. 
Interestingly however, measured by the dispersion of shareholder base, funds with fewer owners are 
more likely to realize lower volatility levels in excess of market volatility.  
 
Figure 1. Fund volatility to market index volatility from 1998 to 2009. The figure presents the annual average volatilities in 
excess of market index volatility (relative volatility) for three fund sample groups. The ratios are presented for the 25th, average and 
75th percentile relative volatility observations for the sample years in question. The steeper slope shows that funds in the high risk 
quartile change their risk level more aggressively along general market movements, whereas the average low risk fund tends to alter 
its volatility to benchmark volatility with smaller adjustments. The figure also shows that funds’ risk-taking in comparison to their 
benchmark indices is cyclical.  
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Table 10 
Characteristics of High and Low Risk Level Funds 
Table 10 compares the fund characteristics for two fund groups consisting of high and low volatility funds. The 
aggregate sample is sorted by monthly relative volatility (RV) and 25 % of the funds with the lowest and 25 % of funds 
with the highest risk level are chosen to present low and high volatility fund groups, respectively. The subgroup of low 
(high) risk funds contains all observations with RV < Q1 (RV > Q3). The table presents the mean, median and standard 
deviation for each fund variable in low and high volatility group. The data covers the aggregate sample period from 
January 1998 to July 2009. During this period, the subsamples include 6,843 observations for both high volatility fund 
groups, sorted out from the aggregate sample of 27,372 observations. 
               
 Mean  Median  
 
Std. Dev. 
Variable Low Risk  High Risk  Low Risk High Risk   Low Risk High Risk 
         
TNA (€ million) 68.4 44.0  26.9 15.69  128.6 80.0 
Fund age (months) 73.8 80.5  58.0 59.0  57.0 66.56 
Return 1-mth (%) 0.52 –0.16  1.33 0.17  7.24 8.11 
Excess return 1-mth (%) 0.02 –0.07  0.16 –0.10  4.76 5.70 
Management fee (%) 1.62 1.55  1.60 1.55  0.64 0.59 
Subscription fee (%) 1.20 1.05  1.00 1.00  0.79 0.59 
Redemption fee (%) 0.91 0.89  1.00 1.00  0.49 0.38 
Minimum investment (€) 20,762 20,856  500 500  115,985 119,939 
Number of shareholders  8,542 9,488    1,123  1,269   25,092  33,491 
                
 
Evaluated both with raw and excess return, investors’ decision to choose low risk fund over high 
risk fund has been profitable; the average high risk fund has not only generated larger uncertainty to 
its shareholders in terms of higher volatility, but has also been incapable to generate higher returns 
in exchange to the higher risk; both raw and excess returns are lower compared to the ones of an 
average low-risk fund.  
On average, low-risk funds charge higher total fees (front-and back-end load fees plus management 
fee); as relative volatility is the ratio of fund volatility to market volatility, this indicates that the 
‘least actively’ managed funds have been the more expensive ones to invest in. If we consider that 
one motivation for fund investor to choose active fund over passive index fund is that the manager 
actively alternates the portfolio composition to differ from market index movements in terms of 
performance or volatility, higher fee levels should be moreover allowed to high-risk funds.  
As shown in Table 10, the fee component that especially makes the mean low-risk fund more 
expensive is subscription fee, being 15 basis points higher than for the average high-risk fund. The 
subscription fee is incurred at the time of purchase, before the value of investor’s portfolio is 
affected by the investment choices of the fund manager, which means that although these choices  
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Table 11 
Cross-Sectional Regressions for Risk-Taking Behavior – Simple and Relative Volatility 
The regression results for testing the relation of risk-taking behavior and the selected six fund attributes are presented. 
The risk-taking behavior is analyzed in terms of the two monthly measures, simple and relative volatility (RV). Simple 
volatility is the standard deviation of daily fund raw returns, whereas relative volatility is the ratio of simple volatility to 
market index volatility. The regressions are run for the aggregate sample of 27,372 observations, covering the sample 
period from January 1998 to July 2009. The coefficient estimates of two-tailed tests and their associated t-values (in 
parentheses) for denoted significance levels are presented for both cases. As the sample covers all equity funds 
regardless of the market they are investing in, it is important to notice that simple volatility does not take into account 
market differences, whereas relative volatility is a market-adjusted measure. For example, a fund can have high 
volatility levels in absolute terms but when the risk level is adjusted to the general levels of the specific market, the 
volatility is of normal level. Both regressions show multiple statistically significant variables, but the magnitude differs 
significantly depending on the risk-taking measure used. 
Variable Simple Volatility (SV) Relative Volatility (RV) 
1. Intercept 0.067 1.356 
(121.23)*** (134.34)*** 
 
 
2. ln(assets), m € –0.003 –0.052 
(–33.44)*** (–27.29)*** 
 
 
3. Prior excess return 1-mth –0.023 –0.506 
(–5.98)*** (–7.36)*** 
4. Min investment < 0.001 < –0.001 
(1.87)* 
 
(–1.25) 
 
 
5. Subscription fee –0.213 –5.929 
(–8.15)*** 
 
(–12.51)*** 
 
 
6. Redemption fee 0.597 –0.175 
(14.56)*** 
 
(–0.23) 
 
 
7. Owners < 0.001 < 0.001 
(27.05)*** 
 
(20.3)*** 
 
F-value 279.7*** 177.1*** 
Adj. R2 0.058 0.037 
Number of obs.  27,372 27,372 
 
***, **, * denoting the statistical significance at levels 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10, respectively. 
 
result in deterioration of investor’s share value, the subscription fee has already been charged. For a 
point of comparison, the average management and redemption fees of a low-risk fund are 7 and 2 
basis points higher, respectively, than the ones for the average high-risk fund. This difference raises 
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the question of why do low-risk funds charge a large majority of fees up-front in form of 
subscription fees. 
H1: Larger equity funds take less risk 
Equity funds being smaller measured by their net asset value commit to more aggressive risk-taking 
behavior, a finding consistent with Hypothesis 1. As reported in Table 11, both simple and relative 
volatility regressions produce a negative coefficient, being statistically significant at the 1 percent 
level for both cases. The negative causality implies that funds with larger asset base commit to more 
conservative risk-taking behavior and maintain lower volatility levels in absolute terms, but also 
lower than their respective market benchmark index volatility level. 
As fund’s risk-taking behavior is measured by relative volatility (RV), the asset variable contributes 
significantly stronger to risk-taking behavior, compared to the regression where simple volatility 
(SV) is used as the risk measure. The coefficients for SV and RV are –0.003 and –0.052, 
respectively; this indicates that for the model measuring risk in relation to market risk, the negative 
contribution of asset size to fund’s risk-taking behavior is over tenfold compared to the model using 
fund’s absolute volatility. Relative volatility separates between active and passive risk component 
on fund’s behavior, so it appears that for larger funds it would be a more delicate issue to lose out to 
their market index, which is why they maintain lower risk levels. In aggregate, funds with larger 
assets under management (AUM) prefer lower risk levels also in absolute terms, so the 
underperformance in relation to market index is not necessarily their only motivation to take less 
risk.  
The results are in line with Beckers and Vaughan (2001) who argue that managers operating with 
smaller AUM maintain their flexibility; the average transaction costs of smaller funds may be 
higher (lower economies of scale), but on the other hand, they can buy and sell stocks more flexibly 
as their transaction size is significantly smaller than transactions of larger funds. As Pollet and 
Wilson (2008) find that larger funds respond to asset growth by increasing their existing ownership 
shares rather than by further diversification, it appears that the relatively more aggressive risk-
taking behavior of smaller funds would originate from their flexibility rather than from their 
different investment style. 
The regression results of larger funds being more conventional in their risk-taking behavior are also 
consistent with other results of Pollet and Wilson (2008) who find larger funds to have lower risk 
levels, whereas smaller funds tend to hold riskier portfolios. They find the funds with larger TNA to 
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diversify more rapidly in response to asset growth which could also explain the significant 
coefficients in Table 11; the largest sample funds, often belonging to a family, have fairly large 
resources devoted to investment research. As opposite, smaller sample funds are often part of a 
smaller company managing only few funds the most; the research for these funds is often made by 
few people alone and is thus fairly restricted. The portfolios of these funds are thus less diversified 
which in most cases will directly result in higher volatility. A more detailed examination of this is 
however out of the scope of this thesis. 
Controversially, funds having more shareholders commit to higher risk levels, a finding inconsistent 
with Hypothesis 1. Although OWNERS coefficient is statistically significant at the 1 percent level 
for both regressions, the coefficient for OWNERS remains really small (< 0.001), implying number 
of owners has only a marginal effect on fund’s risk-taking behavior; still, the contribution of 
OWNERS does not change even though it is regressed alone to the risk measure (Appendix B), so 
the variable contributes to funds’ risk-taking behavior. 
The negative relation between number of shareholders and fund’s risk-taking can be an indication 
of the principal-agent problem. As argued previously, fund asset size and number of owners relate 
to risk-taking behavior because of different reasons, which supports the idea of shareholders’ 
monitoring power being diluted as the number of shareholders increase. The correlation between 
minimum investment requirement and number of shareholders is negative (–0.064), meaning funds 
with fewer shareholders require higher capital stakes from the investors. In turn, investors investing 
larger amounts are more often wealthier and more sophisticated, so one could expect that they 
monitored their fund investment with more scrutinity. Controversially, funds with more 
shareholders are often family funds with a retail bank background and their ownership is highly 
dispersed over different types of investors. The average capital stake of an investor assumedly is 
also lower. Funds with more shareholders are thus incentivized to commit to riskier portfolios since 
the influence of larger shareholders is relatively weaker, and in a case where the higher risk is 
realized, capital redemptions of a group of investors is not that critical to fund’s existence as would 
be for a smaller fund.  
H2: Funds having performed better in relative terms (excess return) in the previous period take less 
risk during the following period.  
Poor performance in previous month encourages funds to have higher volatility levels in the 
following month. Both simple and relative volatility regressions produce negative coefficients, –
0.023 and –0.506, respectively, and are statistically significant at the 1 percent level. The finding is 
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consistent with Hypothesis 2 of the inverse relationship between prior performance and consequent 
risk-taking behavior. The results are also consistent with the findings of Brown et al. (1996) who 
find funds to increase their portfolio volatility after a period of poor performance. Set against the 
convexity of flow-performance curve, this would mean that the fund has an incentive to aim at 
better performance by increasing its risk level, since although the probability of larger losses is 
higher, the fund will not be punished with outflows to the same extent it will attract inflows if the 
risk-taking turns out profitable. 
The worse the performance in previous month, the more the funds are tempted to increase their risk 
level in the next month compared to their benchmark index. The coefficient for relative volatility 
regression is significantly larger than the prior return coefficient for simple volatility regression, 
implying that after a poor period of performance funds are more aggressive and choose more often 
higher risk levels than the risk level of the market index in general. The finding is inconsistent with 
Ammann and Verhofen (2007) who show that the prior performance has a positive impact on the 
choice of risk level. More precisely, they find funds to increase beta and tracking error, i.e. fund’s 
deviation from the market index after a period of good performance. Their finding supports the idea 
of overconfidence after a period of good returns, but on the other hand the overconfidence 
reasoning can be also applied to the negative relation found in the regressions of this thesis.  
One would expect that after a period of poor performance the fund manager decreased fund’s risk 
level in order to avoid larger losses in the next period. However, it appears that, instead of 
becoming more conservative, funds increase risk level in hope of generating higher excess returns 
in the next period. The finding on the relation of previous return and following risk-taking is in line 
with Koivulintu (2002) who also finds poor-performing Finnish equity funds to increase their risk 
levels and well-performing funds to lock into profits by decreasing risk levels. The latter type of 
behavior appears rational whereas risk increase after a poor performance reflects manager’s 
competitive attitude towards losing out to the market and overconfidence of own capabilities.  
The relation of consequent high risk after a poor period of performance implies that the fund 
managers having incurred relative losses in the previous period become more risk-seeking although 
there has not been any increase in the probability that they will beat the market index in the 
following period. The risk measure does not however take account change in the risk level, so the 
results only signify that worse-performing funds have higher risk levels in the next period in 
relation to the better-performing funds. 
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H3: Younger funds commit to more aggressive risk-taking behavior. 
The regression results do not support the relation of fund age and risk-taking behavior, and thus 
Hypothesis 3 is not accepted. Age variable does not contribute to funds’ risk-taking behavior in the 
initial model (Table 8), nor does it provide any sign of relationship if individually regressed to 
relative volatility (Appendix B). The finding is inconsistent with Brown et al. (2001) who find the 
survivorship of younger funds to be more sensitive to industry benchmark performance; their results 
indicate that younger funds would act differently in the market.  
The results show that the length of funds’ operating history does not affect the way equity funds 
convey risk in their current operations, and may also reflect the nature of risk-taking: the 
performance is evaluated moreover in short-term periods, and also the older, well-established funds 
act in the market as actively as younger funds. It thus appears that, despite their longer operating 
history, older funds do not experience any age advantages that could be observed in their risk-taking 
behavior.   
H4: Funds having higher minimum investment requirement commit to more aggressive risk-taking 
behavior. 
The two risk-taking measures produce contradictory results for the relation of minimum investment 
requirement and risk-taking behavior. In simple volatility regression, the coefficient is extremely 
small (< 0.001-3) but positive, and significant at the 10 percent level. However in relative volatility 
regression, the coefficient estimate is not only negative and extremely small, but also insignificant. 
Since the coefficients for both regressions are extremely small and conflicting, I am not able to 
draw any further conclusions about the fact whether funds with higher minimum investment 
requirement commit to more aggressive risk-taking; as there exists no theoretical background about 
why the results of the two regressions should produce different results, Hypothesis 4 cannot be 
accepted. 
H5: The level of mutual fund fees is related to equity funds’ risk-taking behavior 
Funds charging higher subscription fees commit to more conservative risk-taking behavior. 
Subscription fee coefficients are highly negative for both simple and relative regression and 
significant at the 1 percent level, a finding supporting Hypothesis 5.  However, a striking difference 
between the two models is that, for relative volatility the negative coefficient of –5.93 is multifold 
compared to the subscription fee coefficient in simple volatility model (–0.21). 
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The finding indicates that equity funds at the high-risk end would exploit lower front-end loads to 
attract capital inflows and that the lowest subscription fees were offered by funds that deviate the 
most from the risk level of their benchmark index. The results support the implications of Barber, 
Odean and Zheng (2005) who state that high salient front-end load fees chase away potential 
investors. If theoretically only 50 % of funds are able to beat their benchmark indices in the long 
run and performance persistence does not exist, it would appear logical that high-risk funds used 
low subscription fees in order to attract inflows; a fund with a high risk portfolio is more probable 
to also incur larger losses than an average equity fund which means that capital flows for these 
funds react differently towards volatility, i.e. these funds locate at the other end of the flow-
performance curve. 
At the same time, family dummy is negatively correlated with subscription fee (–0.102), implying 
that retail bank funds charge lower subscription fees. Family funds thus use low front-end loads to 
attract new capital inflows, although at the same time one might expect that the search costs for 
investing in a family fund were fairly low. Interestingly, both management and redemption are 
positively correlated with family dummy, which would imply that retail bank funds collected the 
majority of fees only after the investor has approved to invest in a certain retail family. As people 
generally buy retail banking services from one provider for a long-term period, one could expect 
that the capital once invested in retail bank family funds would remain longer in the family on 
average; I thus argue that, in Finland, this type of action of retail family funds is a good example of 
strategic fee-setting practice. 
Measured with simple volatility, equity funds with higher risk levels charge higher redemption 
fees. The redemption fee coefficient of 0.597 is statistically significant at the 1 percent level, 
supporting again Hypothesis 5 arguing for the relationship of fund fees and risk-taking behavior. 
The finding is in line with Koski and Pontiff (1999) who find load fees to discourage excessive flow 
variation. For high-risk funds, the usage of higher back-end loads thus incentivizes investors to 
maintain their ownership instead of cashing them out in case of risk realization. 
The previously presented results of Barber et al. (2005) state that, in addition to subscription fees, 
investors react strongly towards high redemption fees. Based on the risk-return relationship, it is 
highly probable that funds engaging to more aggressive risk-taking behavior also experience larger 
losses than the lower-risk funds in their peer group. Although bad performance is not always 
punished with commensurate outflows as would be expected from rational investors, it is obvious 
that realization of these bad outcomes has negative effect on fund’s reputation. When an investor is 
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induced to withdraw his ownership from the fund due to risk realization and losses the fund has 
been experiencing, he may be motivated to stay as a shareholder; to hold ownership and wait for 
appreciation, and at the same time avoid even larger losses for paying redemption fees of share 
selling under subscription price. 
However, redemption fee coefficient proves to be statistically significant only for the simple 
volatility model. The positive coefficient estimate is statistically significant whereas for relative 
volatility model, the redemption fee variable is not only insignificant but also the coefficient is 
negative. As there exists no theoretical explanation of why the coefficients produced by the two 
risk-taking measures should differ by their sign, I am not again able to draw any conclusions on the 
final relationship of redemption fees and risk-taking behavior. Thus, I am not able to accept 
Hypothesis 5 in terms of redemption fee variable, and only subscription fee is concluded to have 
effects on funds’ risk-taking behavior.  
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6.3 Fund family membership and risk-taking behavior 
Family and non-family funds differ significantly by their characteristics, as reported in Section 5. 
The differences reported in previous sections signify that, as the results in section 6.2 show that 
fund characteristics are related to mutual funds’ risk-taking behavior, I should be able to find 
significant differences also in the risk-taking behavior between family and non-family funds. To my 
best knowledge, the differences in risk-taking behavior between family and non-family funds has 
not been studied with the bank-dominated Finnish market data, which further highlights the 
importance of this section. 
6.3.1  Risk level differences between family and non-family funds 
The division of sample funds to family and non-family funds provides a natural starting point to 
examine the relation of fund family membership and the motives for mutual funds’ risk-taking 
behavior. Theoretically, there exists no distinct explanation why, on average, family fund’s risk- 
taking should differ from the risk-taking of a non-family fund. Elton et al. (2007) find that high risk 
funds tend to concentrate in certain families but no theory supports the idea of why this effect 
would not even out when dissecting across families and equity fund population. The population of 
non-family funds should evenly embody both low and high risk level funds and equally, family 
funds should practice both more conservative and aggressive risk-taking. 
On an annual basis, non-family funds show a propensity to maintain higher risk levels in 
comparison to family funds. Measured by relative volatility, the average non-family fund appears to 
have more aggressive risk-taking behavior through the sample period from January 2002 to July 
2009, although during some periods family funds seem to commit to more aggressive risk-taking 
behavior. The time points of intersection for the two groups in Figure 2 are interesting; at bull 
market (2004–2007), non-family funds take more risk in relation to market index compared to 
family funds, whereas during bear market (2003 and 2007–2009) they have been more conservative 
in risk-taking than family funds. After the start of the financial crisis in 2007, both family- and non-
family funds have significantly decreased their risk levels below those of market indices. In 
aggregate however, the sample period is too short for further analysis about family- and non-family 
funds’ behavioral differences in various market conditions. 
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Figure 2. Annual average risk levels of family and non-family funds. The figure plots the average annual risk levels 
for family and non-family funds. The annual risk level is measured in terms of relative volatility (RV) which describes 
funds tendency to have materialized volatility below or above respective market index volatility. In general, if RV < 1, 
the fund has had lower volatility than the market index; respectively, if RV > 1, the standard deviation of fund returns 
has been larger than the standard deviation of market index returns.  
 
 
The sample for family and non-family funds produces contradictory results on the theoretical 
assumption of volatilities being randomly dispersed across the two groups. Table 12 shows that 
non-family funds commit to higher risk levels in terms of simple volatility, whereas for relative 
volatility the differences in risk levels are not so clear. The standard deviation of simple volatilities 
across family funds is 2.56 % whereas for non-family funds the dispersion is 2.95 %; similarly, in 
case of relative volatility the standard deviation for non-family funds 0.48 in comparison to the 
family-figure of 0.43, indicating that non-family group includes more often funds that deviate from 
the general risk levels (in absolute or relative terms). The observations are in line with theoretical 
assumptions, 23 since if both family and non-family funds exploit the same population of investment 
opportunities across different regions, industries and sectors, the possible differences should even 
out while examining the simple volatility measure across these two groups. 
  
                                                 
 
23 The similar magnitude of standard deviations for volatility figures also indicates that both family and non-family 
funds are diversified in different markets (i.e. geographical, industry). For example, if non-family funds were more 
often funds that invested in emerging markets or small cap companies, i.e. in more volatile markets, this skew should be 
observed in the standard deviation of volatility for the group. Thus, by measuring the sum of systematic and 
idiosyncratic risk, the two groups do not differ from each other by their risk characteristics, which should be the case 
also in theory. 
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Table 12 
Risk Levels of Family and Non-Family Funds  
The table reports the scale for the two variables measuring risk-taking behavior, simple and relative fund volatility. 
Simple volatility is the standard deviation of fund’s daily returns whereas relative volatility is the ratio of fund’s simple 
volatility to market index volatility. For both variables, a minimum, 1st quartile, mean, 3rd quartile and maximum 
observation is presented. The figures are drawn from the sample between January 2002 and July 2009, consisting of 
funds that are managed by a fund company backed by a Finnish retail bank (family funds) or other management 
companies that have a permanent establishment in Finland (non-family funds) and belong to the Finnish Association of 
Mutual Funds. The sample excludes funds of foreign mutual fund families and mutual fund companies that do not have 
a place of business established under their own name. Panel A describes the two risk measures for a subsample of funds 
belonging to a fund family. Panel B reports the same figures for non-family funds. The sample size totals 18,903 
observations, of which 9,221 are family observations and 9,682 counts for non-family funds.  
                 
Panel A: Risk Levels of Family Funds 
Risk measure Min. 25th Mean 75th Max 
   Simple volatility (%) 0.232 3.745 5.660 7.005 21.412 
   Relative volatility 0.023 0.892 1.111 1.207 5.665 
Panel B: Risk Levels of Non-Family Funds
Risk measure Min. 25th Mean 75th Max 
   Simple volatility (%) 0.593 3.770 6.026 7.579 20.822 
   Relative volatility 0.106 0.852 1.096 1.193 5.766 
            
 
The correlation matrix (Table 7) in Section 6.1 and Appendix B show that family dummy predicts 
that funds belonging to a family held more conservative portfolios. The correlation between relative 
volatility and family dummy is negative, and in individual regression the negative family coefficient 
is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. However, Table 8 in Section 6.1 shows that 
ln(assets) variable renders family dummy positive for each progressive regression due to their 
relatively high correlation of 0.219. Thus, family dummy is not applicable to the regression model if 
ln(assets) is included. In turn, the model excluding ln(assets) in Appendix C shows that family 
dummy ultimately produces negative coefficients for both simple and relative volatility regressions, 
and the results are statistically significant at 1 percent level. The risk-taking behavior of family and 
non-family funds thus does differ, a result consistent with Hypothesis 6; funds belonging to a fund 
family hold less risky portfolios than non-family funds.  
The differences between risk levels for family and non-family funds conform to the findings 
suggested by previous studies. Koivulintu (2002) finds Finnish bank-managed funds to generate 
inferior returns compared to non-bank funds. The studies of both Knuutila et al. (2007) and 
Korkeamäki and Smythe (2004) show that Finnish bank-managed funds have received significantly 
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fewer Morningstar top ratings than non-bank funds24, indicating also that bank-managed family 
funds earn lower risk-adjusted returns than non-bank funds. For the sample employed in this thesis, 
however, I am not able to find similar return-related differences that would be statistically 
significant. 
The differences in risk-taking behavior between family and non-family funds can emerge because 
of two reasons. First reason: the median family fund in the sample is over 40 % larger than a non-
family fund. Thus with higher probability, bank-managed family funds are faced with operational 
constrains presented by Pollet and Wilson (2008), such as higher ownership and liquidity costs. 
However, as Pollet and Wilson suggest that funds respond to asset growth by increasing their 
existing holdings rather than diversifying further, this would mean that family funds were relatively 
less diversified and thus held more volatile portfolios. As family funds in the sample have more 
often portfolios with more conservative risk levels, my results do not conform to the rationalization 
suggested by Pollet and Wilson. Finnish family funds are also relatively small compared to the 
funds of larger, international fund companies, which would also not support the hypotheses of fund 
size affecting the risk-taking behavior of family funds. 
The second reason: the investor has to incur high search and switch costs if he switches to another 
fund company. Fund families often offer the opportunity to switch funds within the family at no 
cost and the investor is easily kept in the family. In order to go outside the family the investor 
should first make effort to find a new fund and then, pay fees for subscribing shares. The high costs 
of switching the company are widely acknowledged among families, and as the findings of Massa 
(2003) indicate, this affects ‘the target level of performance the family wants to reach and the 
number of funds it wants to set up’. This directly thus signifies that the risk-taking behavior of 
family funds is affected by the target level of performance. As family funds attract larger capital 
flows [Knuutila et al. (2007)] but generate lower risk-adjusted returns and offer more often passive 
asset management, they are evidently offering investor with some other benefits than the general 
ones related to risk and return characteristics.  
As Massa (2003) suggests, family funds actively compete with non-performance-related 
characteristics such as fees and thus are not competing in terms of performance. On average 
however, salient subscription and redemption fees are both higher for family funds, which indicates 
                                                 
 
24 Morningstar mutual fund rating service provides start ratings that are based on fund’s historical performance in terms 
of return and risk characteristics in comparison to fund’s peer group. In more detail, the ratings are based on 36-month 
load-adjusted returns that are employed to calculate a three-year risk-adjusted rating for each fund.  
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that the Finnish retail bank funds do not compete in terms of price. In aggregate, the lack of 
performance-related incentives seem to directly affect the risk appetite of family funds and thus 
explain the phenomenon of family funds having more conservative portfolios. This would indicate 
that for example larger family funds chose certain investment strategies since they trade in larger 
capital bulks. 
6.3.2  Are high-risk funds concentrated into certain families? Panel evidence 
The existence of economic self-interest of fund families suggests that return correlation within 
family was low – to assure the maximum capture of investor’s assets the family should offer wide 
diversification possibilities so that the investor would not have to go outside the family. Similar 
argumentation applies to the risk-taking behavior of funds within the family, meaning the family 
should offer funds with different risk profiles. Larger fund complexes often do claim to offer 
extensive diversification possibilities within the complex. Presumably this marketing argument also 
largely explains why many investors more often confine their fund investments to one single fund 
family rather than search for diversification potential from funds of other companies. 
Elton et al. (2007) show that investing in an additional inside-family fund would require this fund to 
yield an extra 50 to 70 basis points to maintain the same Sharpe ratio on investor’s portfolio. 
However in reality, the finding does not take into account that firstly, the investor avoids significant 
search costs if he chooses the new additional fund from inside the complex rather than starts 
hunting out another mutual fund company and fund to invest in. Secondly, many retail bank-driven 
mutual fund companies offer ‘service packages’ with various client bonus programs, meaning the 
client is offered with some benefits if not straight reductions in trading costs, if he concentrates his 
investments for certain service provider. In these types of scenarios, the effective advantages of 
investing in one fund complex will serve as an offsetting asset for the possible decreased Sharpe 
ratio. 
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Table 13 
Concentration of Low and High Risk Funds in Families 
The table reports the level of concentration of low (LOW) and high (HIGH) risk funds in the nine sample families. In 
Panel A, observations are classified as LOWs and HIGHs by using the median relative volatility figure of the period for 
grouping high and low risk funds, a method consistent with Elton et al. (2007). The observation is defined as LOW if 
relative volatility figure is smaller than median observation in the period, and HIGH if it is larger than the median risk 
during the period. Panel B presents the concentration of extreme low and high risk in each family; the observation is 
defined LOW (HIGH) if fund’s relative volatility is smaller (larger) than the 25th (75th) quartile observation. For 
calculating the median and quartile figures, only the sample containing family funds is employed. The second column 
presents the aggregate number of observations in the family. In third and fourth columns, the proportion of LOW and 
HIGH observations is presented as the ratio of LOW (HIGH) observations to the aggregate number of observations for 
the specific family; the proportional number takes into account the varying number of observations for different 
families. Fourth column reports the standard deviation of risk in the family/ the dispersion of relative volatility figures 
within the family. The normally distributed test statistic assumes that the distribution of high and low variances in fund 
family is random so that an average family contains g(number of funds in the family) / 2*HIGHs. The sample size for 
both Panel A and Panel B is the aggregate family sample of 9,221, from January 2002 to July 2009.  
          
Panel A: Median as Divisor for Risk Classes 
Number of Proportion of Proportion of Standard Deviation of 
Family subsample Observations LOWs HIGHs Relative Volatility 
  Family 1  501 47.8 % 52.2 % 0.447 
  Family 2  560 50.0 50.0 0.358 
  Family 3  1,835 47.2 52.8 0.501 
  Family 4  2,238 50.7 49.3 0.444 
  Family 5  2,657 44.9 55.1 0.414 
  Family 6  157 74.0 26.0 0.135 
  Family 7  270 70.1 29.9  0.251 
  Family 8  694 54.4 45.6 0.338 
  Family 9  309 72.1 27.9 0.245 
Panel B: 25th and 75th Quartiles as Divisors for Risk Classes 
Number of Proportion of Proportion of Decrease in Number 
Family subsample Observations Extreme LOWs Extreme HIGHs of Observations 
  Family 1  501 22.6 % 24.2 % 53.1 % 
  Family 2  560 26.8 24.5 48.7 
  Family 3  1,835 23.2 25.9 50.9 
  Family 4  2,238 24.2 31.7 44.1 
  Family 5  2,657 21.0 25.0 54.0 
  Family 6  157 26.0 1.0 72.9 
  Family 7  270 32.1 0.6 67.3 
  Family 8  694 36.5 22.9 40.6 
  Family 9  309 41.3 0.0 58.7 
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Small families are significantly more often populated with low risk funds than large families. Panel 
A in Table 13 shows that the funds of small families concentrate on the low risk levels far more 
often than establish high risk levels among their peer group; the standard deviations of relative 
volatility is also significantly smaller, demonstrating that a large part of funds is concentrated into 
the same end of the risk distribution. The phenomenon is even stronger if LOW and HIGH risk 
funds are divided based on the 1st and 3rd quartile risk observations in the sample. Three of the 
smallest families offer only a minimal fraction of funds that practice aggressive risk-taking in 
relation to other funds in the market. 
The sample size for large versus small families differ, but the fact that funds of smaller families 
have proportionally more LOWs should not be outstripped; even though the median and quartiles 
are greatly defined by the risk distribution of the largest families, there exists no motivation for why 
smaller families should not equally have observations for HIGHs or LOWs within its own fund 
supply. In other words, the large number of observations for larger families should not decrease the 
probability of small families having extreme low or high risk funds. The average fund in smaller 
families (less than 14 funds) has 32 % less assets under management which is a sign of larger 
flexibility of funds of smaller families. My analysis does not however reveal the level of 
diversification for small family versus large family funds, so I am not able to analyze the role of 
flexibility in risk concentration. 
Large fund families offer both LOW and HIGH risk funds to the market, but it appears that some of 
them offer more often HIGH than LOW risk funds. Panel B shows that large families have more 
funds committing to extreme high/ aggressive risk-taking than do small families; the three largest 
families have more than 25 % of observations in the high-risk group. As shown in Panel A, only 
two families out of nine (Family 2 and 4) contain evenly both low and high risk observations when 
compared to the median risk of all families; this should be the case if LOW and HIGH risk funds 
were randomly distributed.  
To examine more specifically the risk concentration while considering the number of funds in the 
family, I apply the normally distributed test statistic developed by Elton et al. (2007)25. Based on 
the results, also in the Finnish fund family market, HIGH and LOW risk funds tend to be 
concentrated in certain families more often than would be predicted by chance. The t-statistic for 
the risk concentration equals to –3.98, a figure significant at the 1 percent level. The result supports 
                                                 
 
25 The method of Elton is more specifically described in Section 4 (Methods) and in Appendix A. 
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the preceding results obtained by simply examining the proportion of HIGH and LOW observations 
in families. The test statistic results are significantly similar to the ones presented by Elton et al. 
(2007), who presents a test statistic of 4.09 across all fund objectives. For equity funds, Elton also 
presents a statistically significant test statistic of 3.02. The similarities indicate that, like in the US 
fund market, also the Finnish fund market and the fund families operating in the market tend to 
concentrate on low or high risk strategies. 
The risk concentration can be seen as a more severe phenomenon in the Finnish fund market as 
evidently the families have fewer funds, which in turn decreases the absolute number of investment 
opportunities within the family if the investor chooses to stay in one family. Combined, these two 
points mean that the probability of investor choosing another additional HIGH or LOW risk fund is 
higher than for investor choosing within a larger family. Elton et al. (2007) also show that, already 
for the US fund families that are significantly larger in size than Finnish families, an investor 
owning initially one fund within the family would need altogether three within-family funds in 
order to maintain the volatility of his previous portfolio. If the investor initially owns more than one 
fund within the family, the number of within-family funds need to be added to the portfolio to 
maintain the risk level will increase substantially. 
6.4 Investor perspective to mutual funds’ risk-taking behavior 
Together with the findings of Koivulintu (2002) who shows that Finnish bank-managed funds offer 
lower returns than non-bank funds, the results presented in the previous sections indicate that family 
funds more seldom reach superior returns due to the fact their risk-taking behavior is more 
conservative. On the other hand, a family fund is less probable to end up in the lowest performance 
quartile. 
It appears interesting that the aggregate sample shows that funds with smaller net asset value 
commit to more aggressive, or active, risk-taking than larger funds. However, this relation does not 
transfer analogously to the results as I examine smaller and larger fund complexes (as for smaller 
families, the average fund size also tends to be smaller). This can indicate that the explaining factor 
here again would be fund family’s liaison to retail banking business; also the previously reported, 
statistically significant result for family dummy and risk-taking would support this intuition. In 
general terms, these kinds of causalities would mean that fund characteristics steered risk-taking 
behavior differently for family and non-family funds, but the causality in this case would exist 
rather between family membership and risk-taking than fund characteristics and risk-taking.  
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The concentration of high and low risk funds into certain families appears illogical in terms of the 
overall family strategy; theoretically any fund complex would want to offer funds with different risk 
or/and return profile as this would guarantee larger market share. For example Massa (1998) 
discusses product proliferation within the fund family, which would also serve for the interests of 
the investor – since, if the investor experiences that the costs of finding an additional fund outside 
the family are too high, and decides to choose another one within the family, the best situation 
would prevail if family siblings were highly differentiated from each other.  
However the findings presented in the previous sections show that an investor confining all his 
investments to a single fund family may hold significant risk concentration, whether low or high, in 
his portfolio. Finnish fund families thus do not differ from US families. Although Elton et al. (2007) 
present risk concentration for US families to be even more severe, the fact that majority of mutual 
funds in Finland are sold through retail banks makes the phenomenon in this small market even 
more severe. The truth of diversification possibilities within the family promised at the time of 
purchase are not necessarily realized if the investor stays within the one family. If however the 
convenience of staying in the same family is favored over more diversified risk and relatively 
higher excess returns, the investor may not have committed himself to the most rational behavior. 
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Table 14 
Acceptance of the Seven Main Hypotheses 
The table concludes on the acceptance of the seven null hypotheses of this thesis. Panel A presents the five hypotheses 
concentrating on the relationship of fund characteristics and risk-taking behavior, whereas Panel B presents the null 
hypotheses for the relation of family membership and funds’ risk-taking behavior. In the first second column, the 
formulation of each hypothesis is described and the second column concludes if the results shown in Section 6 support 
the null hypothesis in question. The second column for Acceptance reports a positive sign if the hypothesis can be 
accepted based on the results in Section 6. If the findings are contradictory to the null hypothesis, the column presents a 
negative sign. 
Panel A: Explaining risk-taking behavior by fund characteristics 
Null hypothesis Acceptance 
 
H1 
 
Larger funds take less risk. 
 
 
+ (measured by net asset value) 
– (measured by number of shareholders) 
H2 
 
 
 
Funds having performed better in relative terms 
(excess return) in the previous period take less risk 
during the following period. 
 
 
+ 
 
 
 
H3 
 
 
Younger funds commit to more aggressive risk- 
taking behavior. 
 
–  
(age variable excluded from the final model) 
 
H4 
 
 
Funds having higher minimum investment 
requirement commit to more aggressive 
risk-taking behavior. 
– 
 
 
H5 
 
 
The level of equity fund’s fees is related to 
it’s risk-taking behavior. 
 
+  
(low subscription fee funds commit to higher 
risk levels) 
Panel B: Explaining risk-taking behavior by fund family membership 
Null hypothesis Acceptance 
 
H6 
 
 
Family and non-family funds differ by their 
risk-taking behavior. 
 
 
+ 
 (family funds commit to lower risk levels) 
 
H7 
 
 
High and low risk funds are concentrated in 
certain families. 
 
+  
(low risk funds concentrated in small fund families) 
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7 CONCLUSIONS 
The academic research has given a lot of attention to the studies on the relation of mutual funds risk 
and return. However, only a small fraction of the research concentrates on the possible motivations 
for risk-taking other than the risk-return optimization. The first emphasis of this thesis is on 
examining the role of equity funds’ risk-taking incentives – the relation of fund characteristics (such 
as fund size, fees and fund family membership) and funds’ risk-taking behavior. Previous studies 
have found some fund characteristics to significantly affect the way mutual funds behave in terms 
of risk-taking [e.g. Gaspar et al. (2006) and Pollet and Wilson (2008)], but to my best knowledge, 
no similar studies have been conducted with the Finnish mutual fund data. If there exists relation 
between funds’ risk-taking appetite and fund characteristics, it is an important indicator for an 
investor who chooses between different types of equity fund investment opportunities. 
The second part of this thesis concentrates of studying the possible risk concentration in Finnish 
retail bank-backed fund families. The Finnish mutual fund market has been well studied and the 
bank-domination of the market and its effects are widely acknowledged [e.g. Korkeamäki and 
Smythe (2004) and Knuutila et al. (2007)]. However, the main focus in previous studies has also 
been on the return rather than risk. The Finnish mutual fund market is highly dominated by the few 
large retail bank-backed fund families that continue to attract large capital flows instead of funds of 
other fund companies. The funds of these bank families do not only have distinctive fund 
characteristics due to e.g. their widespread distribution channels, but they also prove to generate 
inferior returns compared to non-family funds [Knuutila et al. (2007)]. Due to their distinctive 
characteristics and significant dominance of the Finnish fund market, it is of importance to analyze 
fund families’ risk-taking behavior more closely. 
This thesis employs a large dataset of 27,327 monthly observations from the Finnish equity fund 
market. The sample covers a period of over 11 years, and is gathered from the Mutual Fund Reports 
published by the Federation of Finnish Financial Services. A multivariate regression analysis is 
employed to define the relation of fund characteristics and risk-taking behavior, and an absolute and 
a market-adjusted measure of risk-taking is constructed.  
This thesis shows that several fund characteristics are related to equity funds’ risk-taking behavior. 
The most significant fund characteristic in terms of risk-taking is fund size measured by the amount 
of assets under management; larger equity funds commit to more conservative risk levels than 
smaller funds, a result in line with the findings of Pollet and Wilson (2008) who find larger funds to 
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have lower risk levels. The results are also supported by the study of Beckers and Vaughan (2001) 
who argue that funds with smaller AUM maintain their flexibility, being able to deviate more 
effectively from the general market. Pollet and Wilson however also argue that funds with large 
AUM find it difficult to diversify in response to growth and thus make their additional investments 
into the stocks already in the portfolio, which would indicate larger funds were less diversified and 
had higher risk levels. The effect of diversification on the risk-taking behavior of large funds 
remains unrevealed however, as the dataset employed in this thesis does not include information on 
the content of funds’ portfolios. 
The regressions results in each analysis highly underline the importance of subscription fees in 
funds’ risk-taking behavior. High-risk funds charge significantly lower subscription fees if the risk 
level is measured in absolute volatility levels. The effect is even more significant for funds that 
have high risk levels in relative terms, meaning funds that commit to higher risk levels than the 
respective market in general charge even lower front-end load fees. The low subscription fee level 
of high-risk funds is a direct implication of these funds trying to attract capital inflows through low 
subscription fees that are salient for the investor at the time of purchase. The trend conforms to the 
results of Odean and Zheng (2005) who find salient subscription fees to chase away potential 
investors. 
This thesis shows that family and non-family funds differ by their risk-taking behavior. Funds 
belonging to a retail bank-backed fund family commit to more conservative risk levels compared to 
the non-family funds that are more active in their risk-taking. Non-family funds also deviate more 
often from the general market index and maintain higher volatility levels than those of their 
respective market indices. The more aggressive risk-taking behavior of non-family funds is whether 
an indication of their larger flexibility in investment operations or a sign of family funds’ 
inefficiencies and lack of incentives.  
The results reveal significant risk concentration in the Finnish retail bank-backed fund families, a 
similar but a stronger phenomenon Elton et al. (2007) find for US fund families. Low risk funds are 
concentrated in the smallest fund families, whereas only larger fund families offer proportionally 
equally also high risk funds. The distortion is highly relevant in the Finnish mutual fund market 
where not only a large majority of capital is concentrated into family funds, but also over 90 % of 
the Finnish fund holders have confined their fund investments into these families. The simultaneous 
concentration of capital in family funds and their lower risk-adjusted returns [Korkeamäki and 
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Smythe (2004)] prove that the Finnish retail bank-backed funds compete against non-family funds 
with other factors than performance or efficient product proliferation in terms of risk diversification.    
This thesis has two shortfalls that relate firstly to the nature of the regression model and secondly, to 
the reliability of the method of measuring funds’ risk-taking behavior. In the analyses performed in 
this thesis, the multivariate regression model for explaining the relationship of risk-taking and fund 
characteristics has a probability of being endogenous. The model regressors are not necessarily the 
direct determinants of risk-taking behavior, and it is not definite that the subscription fee level, for 
example, would explain risk levels instead of funds’ risk levels defining the level of subscription 
fee. The issue is somewhat problematic as there evidently exists several explanatory variables for 
funds’ risk-taking behavior, but it is not obvious which are the exogenous ones that affect the risk-
taking behavior in reality.  
Another shortfall is related to the method of measuring funds’ risk-taking behavior. The absolute 
(volatility) and relative (market-adjusted volatility ratio) risk-taking measures produce similar 
results for the relation of risk-taking and fund characteristics, but for few variables, deviate in terms 
of how significantly these variables contribute to risk-taking. Absolute volatility has been employed 
in previous academic studies [e.g. Busse (2001) and Brown et al. (2001)], but on the other hand it 
does not take into account that the risk levels of equity funds should be examined relative in terms 
of their market index. Absolute volatility is not necessarily the most relevant measure to examine 
risk-taking as assumedly, mutual funds adjust their operations in relation to their peers or general 
market movements rather than manage funds irrespective of these factors.   
This thesis sets a background for further studies on the fund family membership effect on funds’ 
risk-taking behavior. Fund companies managing a set of own funds have the advantage of attracting 
a large part of investor’s capital into their own funds, which certainly affects the way funds within 
the family operate. I argue that the problem of investors conveying their investments into a single 
family is presents in several countries due to the nature of mutual fund markets, but the 
phenomenon is even more severe in markets like Finland.  
The role of fund families in the market should thus receive further academic attention. The Finnish 
fund market being largely dominated by the retail bank-backed fund companies and their 
widespread distribution channels, it is not guaranteed that the investments of Finnish fund investors, 
especially the capital of private investors, is allocated in the most profitable way. Large fund 
families may have the advantage of economies of scale in research and operations, for example, but 
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is their product proliferation efficient enough and the large market share justified from investor’s 
point of view?     
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix A 
The Derivation of Test Statistic for Measuring Risk Concentration in Fund Families 
The derivation for the test statistic for measuring the concentration of risk in fund families is presented. The test statistic 
is developed by Elton et al. (2007) who analyze if funds with higher or lower risk levels tend to cluster to certain fund 
families. The rationalization of Elton et al. starts from the theoretical assumption of high and low risk funds being 
randomly assigned to different families, as there are no theoretical justifications for the opposite. If high and low risk 
funds are randomly distributed to different fund families, then on average, one could expect a fund family to have g/2 
funds with above-median risk, where g is the number of funds in the family. Yg,h denoting for the number of HIGHs 
(above-median risk observations) in the family, under the null hypotheses this number of HIGHs is an independent 
binomial random variable with parameters (g, ½).                      
 
 
 
Test statistic:           ܼ  ൌ ሾ∑ ௚ܶ,௛ െ ∑ ܧሺ ௚ܶ,௛ሻሿ / ට∑ ܸܣܴ൫ ௚ܶ,௛൯ு௛ୀଵு௛ୀଵு௛ୀଵ  
                         ൌ ሾ෍ሺ ௚ܻ,௛ െ ݃௛
ு
௛ୀଵ
/2 ሻଶ െ ෍ሺ݃௛
ு
௛ୀଵ
/ 4ሻ ሿ / ඩ෍݃௛ሺ݃௛ െ 1ሻ8
ு
௛ୀଵ
 
 
where Z ~ N (0,1). 
 
 
Moments:                ܧൣ ௚ܶ,௛൧ ൌ ܧ ቂሺ ௚ܻ,௛ െ ଵଶ௚ሻଶቃ ൌ  ܸܣܴ൫ ௚ܻ,௛൯ ൌ  
௚
ସ 
                                   
                                 ܸܣܴൣ ௚ܶ,௛൧ ൌ ܸܣܴሺ ௚ܻ,௛ െ ଵଶ௚ሻଶ 
                                   
                                                   ൌ ሼܧ ൤ቀ ௚ܻ,௛ െ ଵଶ௚ቁ
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ଶ൨
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ሽ  
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                                                   ൌ ௚ሺ௚ିଵሻ଼  
 
 
where           ௚ܶ,௛ ൌ ሺ ௚ܻ,௛െ 1/2݃ሻଶ  
 
                                ௚ܻ,௛= number of HIGHs for family h having g funds in the family   
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Appendix B  
Initial Model: Individual Regressions for Model Variables 
This table presents the individual regressions for the nine initial fund characteristics. The risk measure used here is the 
relative volatility which is defined as the ratio of fund volatility to market index volatility. The table reports the 
individual regression coefficients in order to show the pure contribution of individual variables to risk-taking without 
any noise caused by other model variables (e.g. multicollinearity of model variables that was observed in the correlation 
matrix in Section 6, Table 7). The coefficient estimates of two-tailed tests and their associated t-values (in parentheses) 
are described for denoted significance levels. The sample consists of 27,372 monthly observations for relative volatility 
(regressand) and fund variables (regressors), and covers the aggregate sample period from January 1998 to July 2009.  
 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
1. Intercept 1.276 1.154 1.155 1.156 1.161 1.199 1.162 1.158 1.143 
(201.8)*** (373.3)*** (225.0)*** (366.0)*** (286.6)*** (203.8)*** (163.00)*** (148.66)*** (351.69)*** 
 
2. ln(assets) –0.039 
(–22.04)*** 
 
3. Prior excess –0.510 
return 1-mth (–7.28)*** 
4. Age (mths) < –0.001 
 
 
(–0.36) 
 
5. Min 
investment < –0.001
 
 
(–4.04)*** 
 
6. Family 
dummy –0.017 
 
 
(–2.74)*** 
 
7. 
Subscription 
fee –4.219 
 
 
(–8.95)*** 
 
8. Redemption 
fee –0.956 
 
 
(–1.30) 
 
9. Mgmt fee –0.269 
 
 
(–0.57) 
 
10. Owners < 0.001 
  (11.08)*** 
F-value 485.59*** 53.03*** 0.13 16.28*** 7.52*** 80.06*** 1.70 0.33 122.87***
Adj. R2 0.017 0.002 Negative 0.001 < 0.001 0.003 < 0.001 < 0.001 0.004 
Number of 
obs. 27,372 27,372 27,372 27,372 27,372 27,372 27,372 27,372 27,372 
 
***, **, * denoting the statistical significance at levels 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10, respectively. 
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Appendix C  
Final Model: Family Dummy Included Instead Of Assets Variable 
This table presents the regressions results for the final regressions model when ln(assets) variable is excluded. 
The regressions results are presented for both simple and relative volatility regressions. Ln(assets) variable and 
family dummy have a correlation coefficient of +0.219, and the two variables are inflated if simultaneously 
included to the model. This table shows that, as ln(assets) is excluded from the model, the regressions still 
produce relevant results for the variables that are statistically significant in the model including ln(assets); the 
adjusted R2 and F-values for family regressions are though lower than for ln(assets) regressions, since fund’s 
assets size explain a large majority of funds’ risk-taking behavior. Based on the results presented by the 
regressions below, belonging to a fund family is negatively related to fund’s risk appetite, meaning family funds 
have lower risk levels. The coefficient estimates of two-tailed tests and their associated t-values (in parentheses) 
are described for denoted significance levels. The sample consists of 27,372 monthly observations covering the 
aggregate sample period from January 1998 to July 2009.  
 
        
Fund characteristic Simple Volatility (SV) Relative Volatility (RV) 
1. Intercept 0.059 1.214 
(120.61)*** (137.27)*** 
2. Family dummy –0.005 –0.027 
(–14.15)*** (–4.26)*** 
3. Prior excess –0.024 –0.524 
return 1-mth (–6.32)*** (–7.52)*** 
4. Min investment < –0.001 < –0.001 
(–0.24) (–3.71)*** 
5. Subscription fee –0.209 –5.446 
(–7.84)*** (–11.28)*** 
6. Redemption fee 0.645 –0.172 
(15.36)*** (–0.23) 
7. Owners < 0.001 < 0.001 
(18.17)*** (12.48)*** 
      
F-value 123.7*** 54.67*** 
Adj. R2 0.026 0.012 
Number of obs. 27,372 27,372 
***, **, * denoting the statistical significance at levels 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10, respectively. 
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